The Austro-German customs union of 1931 and its relation to the Anschluss-Movement by Jarnberg, Alice Florence
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1942
The Austro-German customs union
of 1931 and its relation to the
Anschluss-Movement
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/14717
Boston University


BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
Thesis
THE AUSTRO-GERMAF CUSTOMS UNION OP 1931 AND
ITS RELATION TO THE ANSCHLUSS-MOVEMENT.
By
Florence Jarnberg
submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
1942

I 1 ri-
Approved
by
First Reader .^tTTN"^.^-T^
Professor of lC»-^^i^\j^
Second Reader
Professor of
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2015
https://archive.org/details/austrogermancustOOjarn
OUTLINE Page
INTRODUCTION IV
.
Ch. I . Historical Background 1
Ch. II. The Peace Treaties and the Anschluss-
movement 6
Ch. III . Economic Conditions in Austria After the
World Vy'ar I.
1, Economic Conditions in General 13
2. Agriculture 16
5. Industry 19
4. Trade 24
5. Unemployment 29
6. Starvation 51
Ch. IV . Reconstruction Under the Leamie of Nations
and the Anschluss-movement
1. Mayr, Provincial Separatist Movements
and Pro-German Orientation 34
2. Schober, "Watchful Waiting" and the
Lana Treaty 38
3. Seipel and the Geneva Protocol 39
4. Zimmerman and Restoration 40
5. The Layton-Rlst Report 41
6. Removal of League Control. Austro-
German Cultural and Legal Cooperation 43

Page
Ch. V. World Disorder and Claims for Revision of
the Peace Treaties.
1. The World Crisis 46
2. Effect on Austria 47
3. Effect on Germany 48
4. Protest Against the Treaty of
Versailles 49
5. Proposals to Help Austria 51
Ch. VI . The Vienna Protocol
1. Schober 54
2. Curtius Visits Vienna 55
3. The Customs Union Proposed 56
Ch. VII , Opinions in the l^Vorld Press
1. -brance 60
2. Prague 63
3. Germany 66
4. Vienna 69
5. Hungary, Poland, Italy, Bulgaria,
Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia and
Switzerland 71
6. The United States 73
7. Great Britain 75
Ch. VIIT . The Customs Union and the League of
Nations
.
1. Diplomatic Prelude 78
2. The Customs Union Discussed in the
League Council 90

Ch. VIII. Continued Page
5. The Vienna Protocol Referred to the
World Court 85
4. The Collapse of the Credit Anstalt 84
Ch. IX. Advisory Opinion of the ^i/orld Court on the
Customs Union between Austria and Germany
1. The Question to be Considered by the
Court 86
2. The Advisory Opinion 87
5. Anzilotti's Individual Opinion 89
4. The Dissenting Opinion 90
5. Aus tro-German Negotiations Over the
Customs Union Discontinued 92
6. Controversy About the Opinion 93
CONCLUSION 96
COMPREHENSIVE ABSTRACT 99
BIBLIOGRAPHY 103

IV.
INTRODUCTION
A study of the attempt of Austria and Germany to unite in
an economic sense, is intensely intere .-^tin,:^ at this time. Though
it may sound highly speculative, an adequate solution of this
problem mi:jht have prevented the vast destruction and t^e pro-
found misery that has engulfed the world.
This union presented certain problems that are still un-
solved. And it Is doubtful if t^e field of battle alone will
ever present us with the proper answer.
The masses asked for bread - the leaders gave them endless
discussions and false conclusions. Little wonder then that they
were so easily aroused by false prophets with alluring promises.
The historical background, the economic necessities and the
political pressures that worked for and against this attempted
economic union of two related people represent almost a minia-
ture edition of world problems.
Germany and Austria tried, by peaceful means, to accomplish
what later on was consumated force.
It is a typical example of man blindly groping for mastery
of himself, his physical environment and other men.

1.
Ch. I. HI storlcal Background
If the creation of unity between two nations ever is to be
made a reality, economic calculations are not sufficient to a-
rouse the necessary enthusiasm. Of course, economic considera-
tions about possible advantages and disadvantages of such a
union are of >Q;reat importance, but political transformations are
never accomplished by economic necessity alone. The unpredict-
able human soul, with its material and ideal conceptions, its
definite and vague impulses and desires is the origin of social
evoluti ons
.
Modern German and Austrian historians,-^ when discussing
their countries, enthusiastically emphasize the common interests
of their two nations in the past, present and future. This
fresh historical consciousness takes into consideration the cul-
tural, economic, social and political aspects of the Anschluss
movement. To achieve a true conception of this movement, aiming
at union between Austria and the German Reich, the historical
background for the movement should be examined.
The continuous struggle for supremacy between Habsburgs and
Hohenzollerns was an outstanding phenomenon of the old Roman
Empire. The medieval Austrian and German was a subject of his
Duke or Archduke, and he was conscious only of a vague alleglanc<i
to a Holy Roman Empire. Then soldiers were not dying for nation-'
allty - religion was the crusading word.
Martin Luther's challenge of the Pope not only instigated a
1. Naumann, Priedrich, Central Europe
, 1916
Schlf ssler, W., Deutsche Elnhelt, 1937
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religious revolution, but caused a split in the loosely united
Empire. The Northern German princes followinp; the Protestant
banner were determined to maintain their local state rights a-
gainst the Empire. To submit to the Empire meant subservience
to Austria, and that was the same as submitting to the Pope.
Austria remained the champion of the Roman Catholic faith.
Devotion to that church was for a long time the keystone of
Austrian policy. During the Thirty Years War Austria was the
leader of the Catholic Bloc. Through its championship of the
Catholic Church the Austrian Empire gained prestige, and by
judicious marriage alliances it added territories. Bohemia,
Holland, Belgium, Burgundy, Spain and half of Italy thus came
under Austrian domination. Austria's diplomatic and commercial
Interests included all of Europe. But like other mighty empires
wars with Prance, Prussia and Turkey gradually but steadily
drained her resources.
Napoleon's blows finally dissolved the Holy Roman Empire.
This amorphous entity once described as neither Holy, nor Roman,
nor Empire, was replaced by a weak Germanic Bund or Confedera-
tion, headed by the Austrian Emperor.
Austria, after being the abode of enlightened, liberal and
progressive despotism under Maria Theresa, Joseph II and Leopold
II - became, during the early 19th century, the main residence
of reactionary movements. Metternlch seemed to be the main ob-
stacle to any form of national unity and political liberty.
Austria favored a loose alliance of German princes with the

Austrian Emperor as the first among its leaders. Energetically,
Austria tried to prevent the formation of any true national union.
There existed a clear division of tv^o factions within the
Confederation: one led by Austria, and the other by Prussia,
Prom 1815 to 1848, however, the Kings of Prussia accepted Aus-
trian control rather than risk the loss of everything in a
national movement. Some Germans advocated the creation of a
"little Germany", by dropping Austria and her possessions from
the Confederacy, The Frankfurt Assembly of 1848 failed mainly
because of this split into a Kleindeutsch and a Grossdeutsch
faction.
Where Democracy failed in 1848 Bismarck succeeded in 1866,
when the Habsburgs ended their role as leaders of the German
peoples. After th.e Austro-Prussian War, a Kleindeutsch North
German Confederation was formed without Austria. In 1871 a
Hohenzollern was proclaimed German Emperor,
An important contribution to German Unity, even if not
wholly intentional, was the Zollverein. Friedrich List, the
father of the customs union idea, worked to make an economic
union between Austria and Prussia a reality. The statesmen in
Vienna Vvere not, however, very interested when List in 1820
tried to persuade Emperor Franz Joseph and Metternlch to take
the initiative in the creation of a "grossdeutschen" customs
union. List tells in a letter to his wife Febr, 12, 1820,
that in spite of a cold reception in the Vienna court the most
1. Kleinwachter, F. F. G,, Die Anschlussfrage . P. 21.
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•influential manufacturers in Vienna seemed to favor his plan.
The smaller German states were gradually attached to the
lollverein, accomplished as a result of Prussian administrative
reform,-'- Material interests as well as sympathy were the main
motive for joining this Prussian system. It was easy for Prussis
to bring pressure to bear on the states surrounding her territory
by increasing the dues on taxable ^cods or even by forbidding
transit altogether.
In 1854 the Deutscher Zo 11-und Handels verein came into ex-
istence. It included for tariff purposes within a single fron-
tier, the greater part of present day Germany. Austria made ef-
forts to break up the Zoll-vereln. Germany as a counter stroke
came to terras with the Stener verein. Thus the union that had
opposed the Zoll-verein was absorbed in the Prussian system in
1854,
When Prussia had achieved a predominating influence over
most of what now is Germany, Austria came too late, and sought
in vain for admission. The consciousness of national unity in-
creased together with material prosperity and the German states
began to look to Berlin rather than to Vienna as the centre of
this unity,
Austria thus had to abdicate her position as a German state
and their traditional leader. The Habsburg domination was based
on personal loyalty to the reigning family and upon an ancient
tradition of cosm.opoli tani sm as opposed to nationalism, Austria!
population consisted of about 12,000,000 Germans and 39,000,000
1. Ashley, Percy, Modern Tariff Hlstor;;^, 1910. Part I
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non-Teutonics. The Habsburg family was, however, of Teutonic
origin and the official language in the Empire was German.
The Habsburg Empire was overshadowed by the glory of the
Court. The Grafs lived isolated in their glamour. The peasants
were tied to the soil as serfs to their lords. They lived in
memories of other days and viewed the gloomy valleys between the
towering, glittering summits of the Carpathians as the home of
their ancient supernatural gods, v/ere wolfs and hobgoblins.
The different racial masses within the Empire were, however,
pulling it apart. The political rule was unpopular, but the
economic union of the Danube basin gave immense advantages. As
a consequence of this political instability, the Aus tro-Hungariai l
Dual Monarchy had to p^lrsue a very conservative policy both at
home and abroad. This supernatlonal system was gradually de-
prived of its moral and political basis, when Germany's national-
ism invaded Austria and intensified the nationalism of Slavs and
Magyars
,
It is very doubtful if the political structure of Austro-
Hungary could have been maintained, even if the World Vuar had nol
occurred. The conflicting interests of the various nationalist
groups within the Empire was one of the chief causes of the down-
fall of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Ch. II. The Peace Treaties and the
Anschluss Movement .
If the Fran CO-German War of 1870-71 caused the liberation
of Central Europe from Prance, the World War created a stronger
conscious unity between Germany and the Austrian Empire. The
Triple Alliance bound these states together in a political and
military union. According to German historians the spirit of
separatism seemed to have disappeared from the German peoples.
As a last desperate effort to hold together the domains of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Charles, who succeeded Franz Joseph
as Austrian Emperor in 1916, issued a manifesto promising the
formation of a new Austrian federative state.-'- (Oct. 16,1918)
But neither Germans, Magyars or Slavs were willing to surrender
their hegemony. A week after the armistice was signed Charles
abdicated. Dr. Victor Adler later remarked, "Charles never had
a fair chance; but his feet were in the right path and his heart
2in the ri^ht place".
The plans and dreams of Masaryk, Benes, Stefanik, Supeto
and other nationalists were realized, and the Austrian Empire
was shattered by revolutions from v/ithin. Thus the Paris peace
makers should not be blamed for the disruption of the Danubian
Monarchy. ^elf deterhiinati on was sought by the parts of the
former Empire on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points - and the
dual monarchy ceased to exist.
1. Graham, M. vv.. New Governments of Central Europe
, 1924. P. 501
2. Germains, V. W.^^lustria of fo-'Hay
,
1952, P. 20.
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When chaos and disruption threatened Austria in the winter
of 1918-1919 there was a strong desire for an early restoration
of economic stability and order in German-Austria. The ConstitU'
ent Assembly saw two ways open to achieve this goal - to adhere
to a Danubian Confederation and preserve the economic unity or
to unite with Germany. Racial antagonisms and mutual hatreds
made a Danubian Confederation impossible. The provisional gov-
ernment therefore declared the Austro-German Republic an Integra;
part of Germany. 1 Even though Austria had been excluded from
the German Union in 1867 it now seemed natural and easy to re-
enter a democratized Reich, when Austria's survival depended on
the solution of its present difficult problems.
Though the question was not of such grave importance to the
new German ^-overnment, Austria's struggle for union, was of cour
regarded with greatest sympathy. Since the Austrians desired
Union, Germany was glad and willing to absorb them. Stresemann
in his speech in the German Reichstag Oct. 22, 1918 even stresse(
the cultural unity of the two countries. 2 Prederich Naumann
and others showed tbeir appreciation of Austria's desire to oe-
come a part of the German Reich, when they welcomed their "blood
brothers" from the South as new subjects of the Reich. Germany's
official viewpoint v/as displayed in the Weimar Constitution,
where Art. 61 proclaimed that "Deutschdsterrelch erhalt nach
1. Graham, M. W., New Governments of Central Europe, 1924. P.508
2. Ball, M. IV!., Post-War German-Austrian Relations, 1936. P. 11
le
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seinem Anschluss an das Deutsche Reich das Recht der Teilnahme
am Reichsrat mit der seiner Bevolker-ung ent sprechenden
Stimmenzahl . "
However, the Austro- German efforts to realize Anschluss
were vetoed by the Peace conference. Art. 88 of the Treaty of
Saint Germain forbade the union of Germany and Austria. It im-
posed upon Austria the obligation to "abstain from any act which
might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise
her independence." 2 'phe Austrian independence was inalienable
except with the consent of the League of Nations. The Austrians
were also forbidden to call their state German-Austria. The
name was changed to the Republic of Austria.
Art. 61 in the Weimar Constitution was condemned as a vio-
lation of Art. 80 in the Versailles treaty, according to which
Germany promised to "respect str' ctlv the independence of
Austria." 3 Under threat from France, that the right bank of
the Rhine would be occupied, Germany declared Art. 61 without
force.
France was particularly eager, during the peace negotiation j
to reduce Germany, Austria and Hungary to a state of military
impotence, - to eliminate any danger of a nev/ war between France
and Germany. This distrust of German political leadership and
1. Kleinwachter, F. F. G., Die Anschlussfrage, 1930. P. 74.
2. Carne.Q-ie Endowment for International Peace, The Treaties of
Peace
,
1919-1923. P. 297
3. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Treaties of
Peace, 1919-1923. P. 59
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fear of G-ermany in general seemed to have influenced the whole
atmosphere of the peace conferences. Many of the political peacr
arrangements show that the decisions were achieved under the in-
fluence of war passions and war psychology. The document con-
tained much that in a more sane and sober atmosphere wo'uld have
been considered unworkable and unjust.
Some Austrian bankers and industrialists assured the Entent<
representatives in Vienna that Austria did not need the Anschlus!.,
They feared that Germany would swamp Austria with cheap goods.
There was also a political faction of monarchists working againsi
the Union. They hoped to restore the old traditions of the Habs-
burgs, even if under the form of a Danube federation.
The real supporters of the Anschluss movement were the Pan-
Germans and the social democrats. They wished to strengthen
Austria's position against the nationalistic bourgeois govern-
ments of the Succession States. The farmers and a group of in-
dustrialists also favored the Anschluss. Thus France at the
Peace conference proved that only two parties in Austria favored
union with Germany. Frenchmen even proposed a plan for separat-
ing Southern Germany from Prussia and joining this part with the
culturally more similar Austria.
The heirs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire usually shared
Prance's viewpoint in regard to the Anschluss question. Czecho-
slovakia with its 3,500,000 German minority population did not
wish to be surrounded by a strong Germany. Neither did Italy
care to see Germany too near the South Tirol, inhabited by
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250,000 Germans.
England only mildly opposed the demands by Austria and Ger-
nany for a union. The Anschluss, according to the English view-
point, must apparently not have been of any danger to the Euro-
pean balance of power. Lloyd George Insisted at the Peace confer
ence that there should not be put more Germans under Czech or
Polish rule "than were absolutely necessary".-^ This fact should
however not be over emphasized. Helping the Socialists in Vienna
to achieve a union with Germany, which a lar2;e part of the Aus-
trians seemingly did not want, was not a reason strong enoup;h to
cause England and the United States to come into conflict with
France
.
Lansing is supposed to have prepared a memorandum for use
within the American Government, in which it was hoped that Aus-
tria shall become a small Archduchy within the Confederacy of
German states.^
President vl/ilson revealed his opinion on the question when
be, on board the" George Washington" told Seymour that the
Anschluss movement was only of a temporary nature and would dis-
appear as soon as Austrian economic stability had been restored.^
This statement may have been true if a real economic restoration
mad been achieved, because the Austrians valued their independenc
Tiore than is generally realized.
L. Germains, V. \'u , Austria of To-Day, 1932. P. 91
2. Kleinwachter, P. ?. G. , Die Anschlussfrage 1930. P. 51
5. Ibid. P. 51
i

If, after the war, Austria had been able to recover complete
Ly or in the same degree as other states, criticism of the fail-
ire of the oeace conferences in regard to this problem would not
lave been so overwhelming. Under conditions existing ten years
ifter the peace, a German historian and economist may be justi-
fied when he describes the VVilsonian Fourteen Points as mere emp-
Jcj phrases. Many of the promises that Wilson made were disre-
garded during the peace settlement. Negotiations were performed
Ln secret. Germany was not allowed to participate. Only the
jerman side of the Rhine was disarmed. Self-determination was
3nly an expression without meaning, as in the prevention of the
Austrian Anschluss movement. But people and provinces could not
De treated like pawns in a game and be pushed around from one
naster to another. "Das nationale Sehnen mil* sse beachtet werden.
Die Volker konnte man heute nur mit ihrer eigenen Zustihi^mung
Deherrschen und regieren." 1
With Art. 80 of the Treaty of Versailles the victorious
powers are said to have realized the principle of national self-
ietermination, for which idea they were fighting the war. Yet
[Austria was denied the right of self-determination when she was
Torced to submit passively to the demands of the Allied Powers,
Decause of her complete dependence on other countries for her
rood supplies,
Germany had been forced strictly to respect the independence
Df Austria. This independence was made permanent except with the
L. Leibrock, Otto, Deutschland im welt polltischen Geschehen,
TU^, FT-TS-? —

12.
unanimous consent of the League of Nations. The union could thus
be prevented by only one state, a fact making it almost irapossibii
for a change to occur.
Austria submitted reluctantly to the provisions of the
peace conferences, Renner expressed his thoughts in a public
statement May 8, 1919: "Superior forces may bring about that our
aim shall not be entirely attained today or even that it shall
not be attained at all, but this aim. remains our own as surely aj
we are Germans. No one can ever forget that we are Germans and
consequently the children of the most unhappy nation in the worlc
.
It may be that an epoch of history is against us, but it will be
proved, sooner or later, that the secular tie of blood is strong-
er than a day of history".
French diplomacy, assisted by Austrian bourgeois blindness,
selfishness and intrigues caused the suppression of the Anschluss
movement at the peace conferences. The movement, however, did
not fail completely. The desire for Anschluss remained alive in
Austria, Even if the union seemed impossible to achieve at this
time a large proportion of the Austrian people was still deter-
mined to continue the struggle. The Anschluss movement had only
passed over to a new stage.
1, Graham, M. W,, New Governments of Central Europe, 1924.
TTS^^
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Ch. III. Economl c Conditions in Austria
After the World War (1914-18)
The moral, business and political depression that followed
World War I was not only an Austrian phenomenon. It encompassed
the world, but the tragic effects were particularly evident in
Austria. That nation had become a head without its sustaining
body. The suffering of its people was correspondingly severe.
During the war the Allied people lost their luxuries, but in
Austria the standard of living was reduced almost to starvation.
Germany was beaten and broken and shared the sufferings of
Austria in many respects, but she was never reduced to the same
utter helplessness, nor did she ever experience the same violent
disruptions. To a far lesser extent, the Succession States
shared Austria's fate. They ruled over comparatively wealthy
lands and were more self-supporting.
Austria seemed to be the "sore toe" of Europe - the region
where symptoms of economic disease were first evident. Prom
there social and economic catastrophe spread throughout Europe.
However, as the original focus of disruption Austria suffered
most intensely. Almost every remedy advocated for inflation,
unemployment, exaggerated social service and other economic and
social disorders was tried in Austria and found to be ineffec-
tive. In vain the Austrians tried to convince Entente states-
men that their country was not able to exist alone. This failurd
was reflected in the attitude of the general public. Complete
discouragement and despair finally abolished almost every effort
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of the people to accomplish improvement on their own account.
The Austro-Hungarian monarchy had been like a Pan-Europe in
miniature. It was a political and economic union of the small
nations of the Danube basin. A unity that offered much greater
security than any of the small nations ever could enjoy individ-
ually. The defensive force of a great power ensured peace be-
tween the different parts of the monarchy and kept watch over th^i
security of all of them. Conflicts could be settled in the po-
litical field, not necessarily by arms. After the war the rem-
nants of the Dual Monarchy were set up as different states. None
of them was secure. Jealousy and mutual distrust forced them to
support armies that were three times as large as the armed force;^
maintained by the former monarchy. This contributed to financial,
ruin. Previously, as a lar.^e political unit, these states could
assert themselves in the European concert, now they were left
to the mercy of the Great Powers.
The economic position in Austria at the end of the War was
so serious that it is doubtful if Austria could have survived as
a state without foreign aid. She was in a pitiful situation.
She had not only lost large territories, but all hope of a liva-
ble future. She had little credit and no money with which to
buy necessities. People were starving for lack of food. Machines
were idle for lack of coal. Water-power resources were not yet
sufficiently developed to eliminate the need for just importatioij).
The systems of communi cation failed to function. Grain produc-
tion in Austria was not enough for her own need, more had to be

imported.
These difficulties were due to certain weaknesses inherent
in the Austrian economic system and to obstacles encountered in
foreign trade.
Vienna was, before the war, the capital in a territory of
261,000 square miles with a population of 52 million people.
Austria was then a complete economic unit providing for its own
needs. She was able to protect her a^^riculture from foreign
competition. In fact she used all her own agricultural products
without the necessity of seeking foreign markets. She possessed
enough coal, timber, oil, metal and other raw materials necessar;'-
for her industries. Exporting little, she absorbed most of her
manufactured articles. Truly she formed a perfect autarchy,
economically not dependent on anybody but herself. She could
regulate her own prices corresponding with production costs and
and supply and demand of her own resources and her 55 million
consumers. When prices in the world market fell below productio:i
costs, she could keep her prices unchanged by raising the tar-
iffs.
The peace-makers, according to Leibrock, not only failed to
consider the ri?3;ht of self-determination, but they did not even
understand the geographical, economic and the social conditions
of the small nations when they drew the borderlines to favor
their own strategical position.^
1. Germain s, V. W., Austri a of To-Day , 1932. P. 102
2. Leibrock, Otto, Deutschland im v>feltpoli ti schen (Jeschehen,
1952. m^s "
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Vienna was made the capital of a reduced territory of
32,000 square miles with a population of 6,400,000. Austria had
shrunk to a small, mountainous country situated almost exactly
in the center of Europe. She lost her excellent frontage on the
Adriatic and ceased to be a naval power. The new Republic of
Austria had become a landlocked country like Switzerland. But
mentally and physically she could not cope with a purely inland
situation. She found her traditional trade routes cut off and
her business blocked by Czecks, Yugoslavs, Rumanians and Magyars
Her railway system was not laid out for her new frontiers. With
her wealthiest provinces amputated from her, she had become an
"island" strategically situated in the heart of Central Europe
on the direct route from Germany to the Balkans and the Near Eas'.
Little wonder then that the deficit in Austria's trade bal-
ance was, according to tVe League of Nations, to a large extent
due to the necessity for importing foodstuffs, equal to one thin,
of the total imports of the country. 1 This deficit could have
been reduced if the productivity of a^^ri culture in Austria had
been raised to the pre-war level, or even to a higher level.
Agriculture furnished em.ployment to nearly 50 percent of the pop-
ulation. The Austrian farmers were peasant, proprietors, they
had land but no money. It vms almost impossible to obtain long-
term credits and an excessive rate had to be payed for short-terr
1. League of Nations, Financial Reconstruction of Austria.
Economic Commission'T F^epor t to the Council "on the lYth
Session. C. 757. 1925 II.
2. Dean, V. K, "European Efforts for Economic Collaboration".
Foreign Policy Reports. Vol. VII. No. 12.

credits.
Domestic production of wheat, rye and sugar was not suffic-
ient to nieet the country's requirements. According to investi-
gations made by Dr. Hemmet, Austrian Minister of Agriculture,
the Austrians could, through a 5 - 10 percent increase in pro-
duction get enough rye, oats and potatoes for their own need.
Wheat, corn and maize still had to be imported.-^ This increase
in production could have been realized by Introducing modern
methods of cultivation and by follov;ing a more rationalized ag-
ricultural process in general.
A relatively small part of Austrian land is arable. There
are more meadows and pastures than cultivated fields. Agricul-
ture in mountainous districts was limited to cattle breeding,
dairy industry and forestry. After the war Austria imported a
considerable amount of her foodstuffs, mostly from the Succession
States. They regarded Austria as their principal market in spit^i
of tariff barriers.
Austria imported :2
50 percent of Hungary's cattle and pig export
50 percent of Hungary's grain and flour export
60 percent of Jugoslavia's cattle export
35 percent of Jugoslavia's cereals export
59 percent of Rumania's wheat export
73 percent of Rumania's cattle export
42 percent of Rumania's pig export
1932
1. Leibrock, Otto, Deut schland im weltpoli ti schen Geschehen, P.15
2. Dean, V.M., "European ^iirorLs i or Economic (JollS.boratio"fl"
Foreign Policy Reports. Vol. VII. No. 12.

Before the war these products could be purchased duty-free.
Now they were subject to high tariffs.
The agricultural crisis in Eastern Europe of 1928-31 caused
the agrarian states to demand regional conferences. The agrariaij
parties in Austria favored any possible approach to Germany,
whose agricultural duties were much higher than those of Austria
These parties, being dependent for their existence on the main-
tenance of tariffs, were naturally strongly opposed to any schemes
which suggested the need for their reduction.
Criticising the proposed Customs Union between Austria and
Germany, Bitterman ( Czechoslovaklan economist) pointed rut the
fact that Austria probably would adopt the high protective Ger-
m.an duties on grain in consequence of the union. This would
mean raising the price level of bread for the consumer and the
price of fodder for the cattle-breeders and dairy farmers, who
were Interested in low prices on wheat and flour. The agricul-
tural situation in Austria was not at this time (1931) a good
one - but the same was true in all agricultural countries during
the world crisis.
The development of a>^rl cultural production, however, after
the war gradually made the situation more favorable. Immediate-
ly after the war Austria had to import milk and dairy products.
A few years later she was able to export these products. Agri-
culture was developing into a more profitable source of liveli-
hood before the crisis occurred.
1. Bitterman, M., Austria and the Customs Union, 1931. Pp 17-25.

19.
To remedy this difficult situation Benes proposed that a
Danube Confederation be set up, consisting of the Little Entente
(Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia) and Hungary and Austria,
The political purpose of this union was to draw Austria into the
circle of the Little Entente and alienate her from Germany. From
an economic view point this plan was without value. It would
have ruined Austrian and Czechoslovakian agriculture by abolish-
ing their high protective tariffs. Furthermore, it would not
have 5:1 ven the three agrarian states sufficient markets. In or-
der to place the surplus of the five states in the German, Ital-
ian and Swiss markets important industrial tariff concessions
would have been necessary, thus placing the Austrian industry
in a difficult position.
Perhaps preferential agreements concluded with any or all oi
the European industrial states, being the natural markets for
this surplus, would have improved the situation. But lack of
proper leadership, rivalries and interminable discussions with-
out definite policies let matters slide to their tragic climax.
When part of the Dual Monarchy, Austria was the financial
center of the Empire. Though herself relatively undeveloped as
far as industries were concerned, she had large and varied re-
sources of raw materials and foodstuffs within the Empire. The
peace of Saint Germain destroyed century old industrial channels,
"Die Kohle trennte man vom El sen, die Spindel vom Vifebstuhl, das
Halbgut von seinen Endfertigungsstatten. . . "1 Parts of the same
1. Leibrock, Otto, Deutschland im I'veltpoll tl schen Geschehen.
T^TPT.
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industrial enterprise, that had been absolutely dependent upon
each other had now suddenly been placed within two or even three
different, economically opposed states. Furthermore, Chinese
walls had been raised between the raw materials in the Successioii
states and the manufacturing industries of Austria. Important
branches of Austrian industry were crippled. Deprived of their
sources of raw materials, they also lacked capital. Vvhile the
former Austrian dye-houses and weaving industries fell in the
hands of Czechoslovakia, the spinning mills remained in Austria.
These mills created a surplus that Austria was unable to absorb,
while her weaving capacity was inadequate to meet demands. Her
economy automatically became more and more unbalanced.
Another example of industrial disruption occurred in the
"luxury Industries" - the manufacture of leather goods, clothing,
porcelain and art objects. Since these articles had no adequate
outlet on the domestic market, export was essential. But the
demand for luxuries in the industrial states was not great.
Scarcity of credits' and the agricultural crisis prevented pur-
chases from others, and Austrian industry languished.
This industry was almost purely a post-war phenomenon. Most
of her f ormer manufacturing centers were now in Czechoslovakia.
Austria made the most of her industrial possibilities, and for a
while, bravely carried on in spite of her handicaps. Efforts
were made to tap her Alpine wealth in water-power. Half of it
was going to waste. Through its adequate use, the railroads
could be electrified and the manufacture of electrical apparatus
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would be stimulated. To a remarkable extent these plans were ac-
complished until Austrian electrical appliance industry became
one of the best in Europe. In 1925, the opening of the new
hydro-electric works at Gratz, the Telgi t sch-'vVerke marked a long
step toward the exploitation of Austria's natural wealth of hydrd-
electrlc power. To expand this better utilization of water-powei
the Austrian Government asked for permission to float a special
loan for the electrification of railroads.
1
This tremendous development of water-power since the war is
a vivid illustration of the fact that "the creative energy of
this people, previously dammed up by political preconceptions anc
antagonisms, is beginning to flow into new channels." ^ This
is a new view point opposed to the popular exaggerated idea,
shared by the Austrians themselves, that Austria is "an inherent-|
ly poor country".
Austria's large forests were also an important factor in heij
industrial life. Her furniture manufacturing has always been
known for its high quality. A typical post-war arrangement gave
her the furniture factories, but her Slavonic oaks had to be im-
ported from "abroad".
Austria's wealth in water-power and timber was, however, no
an adequate substitute for her relative poverty in coal mines.
She im.ported practically all her coal. She could not supply her
1. League of Nations, Financial Reconstruction of Austria. 25th
Report by the Commissioner u-ene'ral ol the LeSTgu^ ol nations.
C. 30. 1925. II.
2. Germains, V. W. , Austria of To-Day
,
1952. P. 238

mills wit^ chemicals, fats, oil, rubber and wool without import.
She had very little copper and petroleum.
An effort to reform the management of State industries was
instituted by the government. State forests, salt mines and
other undertakings were placed on the same level as "^rivate bus-
inesses, to free them from all political influences (if possible
A strong spirit of nationalism, with efforts to achieve sel
sufficiency, hampered the marketing of an increased volume of
goods by the erection of high tariff barriers. In the first two
months of 1931 the deficit in the Austrian budget was greater
than in the whole of 1950.^ Numerous enterprises disappeared,
traffic on the Federal Railways decreased, and incomes deteri-
orated in wide circles of the population. The earnings of the
tobacco monopoly shrank considerably, denoting an increased im-
poverishment of the people.
For the purpose of improving conditions, gradually getting
worse since 1929, preferential acjreements concerning industrial
export were advocated to assure Austrian markets for her manu-
factured s:oods. Probably a customs union would have been the
best solution for Austria's steadily deteriorating condition.
Voices for and against, ap:ain debated its merits.
Large sections of Austrian industry feared that a Customs
Union would lead to greater foreign competition and emphasized
1. League of Nations, Financial Reconstru ction of Austria.
25th Report by the Uomnil ssloner lienerai ol the" League of
Nations. C.50. 1925. II.
2, The Economist, London. April 18, 1931.

that with a Customs Union between Austria and Germany, Austrian
industries were in need of '!Zwi schenzolle" to protect their own
interests. Others claimed that the iron industry would gain
from being incorporated into a large economic area. It would
also be an advantage for Austrian timber trade to be a valuable
member of timber starved Germany. On the other hand, union would
seriously effect the electrical low-voltage industry, while the
furniture manufacturers could hardly compete against GermsLny,
Austrian leather industry would suffer great losses and her suga
industry would collapse."^
During confidential discussions in Industrial clubs it
seemed impossible to secure a majority in favor of the Customs
Union. An important requirement v;as the safe guarding of certai^i
Austrian industries. Chemical industry, knitted ijoods industry,
building material and cement industry - they all demanded inter-
mediate tariffs sufficiently high to protect Austrian interests.*^
Dr. £chober saw the problem from a broader viev; point when
he proclaimed that the "industries menaced by German competition
were doomed in any case".*^ He saw the problem of "Free Trade
versus Protectionism" not as a national problem but as an inter-
national problem. Possibly, Schober, as a great leader of Eu-
ir opean thought, came nearer the truth than many other states-
men and thinkers.
1. Bitterman, M. Austria and the Customs Union . 1931. Pp 96-104
2. The Economist, London, April 18, 1931.
3. Germains, V. W., Austria of To-Day, 1932. P. 236

"Economic nationalism assumed greater proportions in the
Succession States of the late Austro- Hungarian Monarchy than in
any other part of the World", according to Einzig.*^ Every one
of them tried to become an independent, self - supporting economic
unit. New frontiers had been created: and new tariff barriers
erected within the former Habsburg Empire - a v&st free trade
area. Thus Austria, after revolutionizing and reorganizing her
industries, found herself cut off from her principal markets.
"The disruption of Austria has deprived her of an important
msrket and her peculiar dependence on imported raw materials of
every kind and on foreign shipping has laid her open to special
injuries from increase of v/orld prices." ^ As a remedy for this
situation Keynes proposed a Free Trade Union consisting of the
whole Central Europe, of Tu.rkey and the United Kingdom, India and
Egypt. This union could in his opinion do as much for the main-
tenance of peace as the League of Nations. If all countries
joined, t^ls union would not mean the realization of 'J'ermany's
dream of a G entrgQ. Europe . If other nations remained outside it
might be true that Germany would be left to enjoy all advantages
of the union. A solution of this kind would not, however, be
easily realized.
"Kombination lost das Problem" states an article in Frank-
1. Einzig, Paul, The World Economic Crisis
,
1929-1951, 1931.
P. 150.
2. Keynes, J. M., The Economic Consequences of the Peace . 1920.
5. Ibid. Pp 266, 267.

furter Zsitung,'^ examining the forei.jn trade in the Danube basin
The Succession States could not consume all the excess productio|ji
of wheat aid rye from the Southern States of the Danube area.
Not even preferential tariffs would help, Germany has a need
for grain that is greater than the whole excess production of
the South Eastern States. An agrarian union of the Danube state
including Germany, with special provisions for industrial tariff
in favor of Austria, was proposed as a solution. Austria should
in any case be forced to turn her economic interests Westward
because of the a-;^ri cultural crisis in the Danube basin. Accord-
ing to a statistical review Prance had almost no economic inter-
est in Austria.
Austria's Foreign Trade (1931)
Participation by:
(In percent of the whole)
In Austrian
Export Import
1. Germany 18.4 percent 20.0
2. The Danube States 35.6 " 36.2
a, Czechoslovakia 12.7 " 18.2
b . Hungary 8.6 " 8.6
c, Yugoslavia 7.4 " 4.0
d, Rumania 5.9 " 4.5
e. Bulgaria 1.0 " 0.9
3. Italy 7.7 " 3.3
4. Switzerland 6.1 " 4.9
5. Poland 5.5 " 9.3
cont '
d
1. Frankfurter, Z eitung, April 15, 1932
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Austria's Foreign Trade (Continued)
Participation by: In Austrian
(in percent of the whole) Export Import
6. United States 3.6 percent 6.5 percent
7. Britain 5.6 " 4.4 "
8. Prance 2.5 " 5.0 "
(Frankfurter, Feitung, April 15, 1952. P. 6)
According to a British viewpoint Austria's trade with Qer-
many was the most important part of Austria's foreign commerce.-^
Her import from Germany averaged 20-22 percent of her total ex-
port and Germany's share in her export was about 18 percent.
A Czechoslovakian economist emphasized the fact, that thp
participation of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Yugoslavia,
Hungary, Rumania, Poland and Switzerland in the Austrian trade
balance showed by comparison that Austria's trade with the seven
latter states was twice as lar,';>;e as Germany's participation.
Austria's trade in finished goods, in which industries the
largest number of workers were employed, showed in regard to the
seven states, a favorable balance of 201.1 million shillings and
in regard to Germany an unfavorable balance of 238.5 million
shillings. A large number of these industrial enterprises could
not exist without the protection of customs tariffs. These tar-
iffs, Zwischenzolle
,
vi^ould, in case of a Customs Union, also be
needed for the protection of German agriculture and certain in-
dustries against Austrian competition. A union would, however,
1. The Economist, London, April 18, 1951
2. Bitterman, M. Austria and the Customs Union, 1951. Pp 32-56
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be mors unfavorable for Austria. Her production would be suppress
ed by the more efficient German industries. jtiixtension of trade
1
i,vith the seven stntes v/is suggested as a more effective remedy.
The difficulty connected with any Customs Union is the
treatment of the most-favored-nation clause. ;;ould all the na-
tions, having treaties of this nature with the union states,
claim the same preferential advantages?
The unconditional form of the most-f^vored-nation clause,
extending to each of the contracting parties all privileges whict
the state may grant to a third state, even without equivalent
compensation is now used by many nations. Exceptions to the
HiOst-favored-nation clause are: Customs Unions, such as the one
established bstv;een Belgiiim and Luxemburg in 1921, and speci?^l
preferential trade clauses, such as in the Baltic and Scandina-
vian treaties.
The grov/ing pro-3ernan orientation in Souths '.stern Europe
caused anxiety in Prance. She feared that Germany would estab-
lish hegemony in Central Europe, when these states, previously
acting as her satellites, nov/ tried to find markets for their
surplus grain in Austria and Germany. This would eventually
result in a brsakdov/n of status quo, one of the most cherished
principles in French diplomacy. Prance emphatically objected to
a Customs Union and fought it with every weapon at her command..
i
especially loans, reenforced by commercial and military treaties,
1. Ibid, Pp 40-44.
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While these diplomatic maneuvers continued, international
and local trade and commerce contracted m.ore and more, not alone
in Austria but throughout Europe and gradually the entire world.
Business was further hampered by uncertain customs duties. From
this comparatively weak position Austria attempted to restore
her markets by negotiations with the Succession States.
To help Austria in her reconstruction program the Economic
Commission submitted to the Sixth Assembly a report concerning
the tariff policy - adopted by the League of Nations, September
1924. "Considering that the system of import and export pro-
hibitions and restrictions constitutes a serious impediment to
the free development of international trade", the Economic Com-
mission wanted the Council to consider the possibility of an a-
greement between State members of the League and even between
State non-mem.ber s . This would be done"with a view to the final
suppression of import and export prohibitions and restrictions."
It was recommended that "provisions relating to the protection
of the vital interests of the States shall not be affected."
They also advised that cases of excessive tariff rates should be
abolished and existing prohibitions should be reduced to a min-
imum. No fresh restrictions should be imposed. Prohibitions
were not forbidden v/hen the restrictions dealt with "national de^-
fense, public order and safety", when they were issued on grounds
of"public health" for the "protection of animals and plants",
1, League of Nations, Financial Re construction of Austria.
Economic Commissi orH Keport to the sixth Asseml5Xy^
A. 4u. 1925 II.

when they were imposed for "moral or for humanitarian reasons"
or for the suppression of "improper traffic." Neither did they
apply for the protection of "national treasures of artistic,
historical or ar cheological value," for prevention oi "unfair
competition" and when they were established "in pursuance of
international conventions regulating traffic of arms, opium,"
etc. To straighten out this confusion, a series of internation-
al conferences were held, such as the Tariff Truce Conferences,
under the auspices of the League. But the practical result of
these conferences v;as comparatively modest. They did, however,
afford a method through which conflicting interests could be
discussed and reconciled in a peaceful manner.
Rem.edies suggested for Austria by Czechoslovakia and the
Little Entente were long term commercial treaties with her
neighbors, enabling Austria to promote her export to her tradi-
tional markets. G-ermany suggested a Customs Union between Austr'
and the Reich, and Briand planned for a United States of Europe,
still a distant and vague idea.
After the ratification of the peace treaty there were still
112,347 people unemployed in Austria and in receipt of relief
payments.^ The Austrian guarantees of compliance with the dic-
tates of the League and its reconstruction agents were embodied
in the so called "Law of Pull Powers". This law gave the min-
istry undivided authority. One of the first acts under the law
was a thorough reduction of state functlai ari es . This consti-
1. Germains, V. W., Austria of To-Day, 1932. P. 103.
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tuted a great addition to the total of unemployed - but it ini-
tiated the lowering of prices and the rise of the Austrian crown
even though thousands of employees of the former Austrian
bureaucracy were left without a livelihood.
The I L 0 explained in its information about unemployment
that the main reason why economic recovery was hampered, v/as
due to lack of confidence in the future. People just seemed to
have lost faith in life and did not care to plan ahead. The
League of Nations had in this respect a great task to accomplish
the restoration of confidence by using the machinery of the Leagjjie
to prevent any recourse to violence.
The report on Austria's economic situation to the League,
September 18, 1925, shows a slight increase in unemployment sine
September, 1924, but this increase was a world wide phenomenon.
In fact Austria's percentage of unemployment was equalled in
Great Britain.-^
Industrial and civil unemployment caused a decline in de-
mand for food. The decrease of the purchasing power among the
agrarian population in turn accentuated the industrial depressioti,
- and the vicious circle gained momentum. Little v^onder then
that unemployment in Vienna in July, 1931 was 86,472 (13,800
higher than July of the previous year). And still the number
of unemployed continued to increase. Many business concerns in
Vienna went bankrupt. Even in the provinces, the number of un-
1. League of Nations, Financial Reconstruction of Austria,
25th Report by the uommissioner (ienerai or tlTe'iieague of
Nations. C. 30. 1925. II.
2. The Economist, London, July 25, 1931.

employed rose steadily.
To make matters worse, there was a marked decrease in puo-
lic building activity. The municipality of Vienna curtailed
construction, because its revenues were rapidly declining. Real
estate was offered for sale everywhere in Vienna and its environ
ment.-'- Next to the building industry with 119,510 unemployed,
the Austrian iron and metal working industries were burdened
with 55,700 unemployed.
According to a Czechoslovaklan economist a Customs Union
with Germany "would cause Austria to suffer from a still greater
relative unemployment than it does today." ^ He emphasized
that a union would make Austria's production more difficult. It
would cause a general raising of the price-level, because, ac-
cording to the same Czechoslovaklan report, the average cost-of-
living was now here as high as in Germany.
3Average Cost-of-Living Index
In gold parity Austria Germany
1929 111.3 155.8
1930 111.3 147.3
This rise in the cost-of-living in Austria would draw her
away from her markets and the consequence would be Increased un-
employment .
Vienna's gravest food crisis occurred after the war and not
1. The Economist, London, Sept. 5, 1931
2. Bitterman, M., Austria and the Customs Union
,
1931. Pp 62-6
3. Ibid. P. 48
(
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while fighting was in progress. For four months after the ar-
mistice the allies maintained their food blockade of the Central
powers. This added to Austria's already severe suffering. Many
thousands of Austrian children had to be sent abroad to be fed
and clothed. Most of them were transported to Scandinavian
countries. To keep the proletariat busy at home, starving,
freezing and unemployed Viennese were sent to Vienna Woods to
cut down firewood.
Austrian statesmen begged the rest of the world to aid theli'
starving country. They threatened that if no help came, the ad-
ministration would collapse and Austria v/ould be left a vacuum oi
anarchy, v/hich no doubt would lead to an easy conquest by a for-
eign state. There were even rumors that Vienna might "go Bolshe-
vik".
The only ray of hope and encouragement in these depressing
conditions was supplied by the American Relief Administration.
This organization undoubtedly saved thousand of children from
starvation and death.
For the next six years Austria was actually kept alive by
"artificial respiration" - partly by financial reconstruction
under the control of the League of Nations and partly/ by Americar
charity. It might be stated that her artificial respiration was
necessary to offset her artificial isolation, which caused her tc
face greater problems than the rest of the world. No other coun-
try experienced the same paralyzing collapse of industry and bani
ing, coupled with moral, mental and physical deterioration of her
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population. Her people were bewildered by the new frontiers and
new tariff barriers. They were slow in achieving the fundamen-
tal readjustment needed to reestablish a sound economy.
The disintegration of economic units caused rapid sinking
in the prosperity level. These disintegrated parts failed to
consolidate into a political unit. Lack of time and hunger,
plus the immensity of the problem delayed the economic and polit-
ical reconstruction that men tried to solve on purely national-
istic lines, v/hereas the real solution rested on international
or even v/orld cooperation.
The real question facing Europe centered on the economic
existence of the numerous small European nations - especially
those in the Danublan basin surrounded and isolated by their
high tariff walls. The problem, that Austria to a certain ex-
tent bad solved, now again faced European statesmen and their
millions of followers. Subsequent history shows they were un-
equal to their task.

Ch, IV. Reconstruc bion Under the League of
Nations and the Ans chluss -movement .
As the Austrian economic situation became more and more dlf
ficult, nev; life was infused Into the Anschluss-movement, The
Allies, however, believed that the continuance of Austria as an
independent state was necessary to the future peace of Europe.
They could not tolerate a stronger Germany,
Finally, during the year 1921 economic conditions in Austri
grew prop;ressively worse. Threatened by economic ruin and chaos
Austria appealed to the allied ':?;overnraent s, and declined to ad-
m"' t responsibility for all the errors of commission and omission
of the old regime. The League sent a committee to Austria to
investigate the situation. The hope of aid from the League
brought encouragement to the desperate Austrian people. But for
quite some time there was no apparent Improvement in the situa-
tion. The Austrian crovm sank daily lower in value, while in-
flation complicated matters m.ore and more.
In spite of warnings against it, this terrible economic sit
uatlon gave new impetus to the Anschluss-movement. The terri-
tories ignored the provisions of the Saint Germain Treaty and re
newed their Separatist movements.-^ A bill for holding a pleb-
iscite on the Anschluss W9s introduced in the Council, The Alliel^
Pov/ers protested vigorously and threatened to punish Austria if
the bill was passed. The plan v;as dropped, but the provinces
1. Woolf L. "Austria and the Union with Germany" Contemporary
Review June - July 1921. Pp. 824-31 Pp. 105-11.

could not see M<ihy tljis prohibition was applied to them.
This agitation for Anschluss in the nrovinces came to a
head when the Tirolese Provincial Diet decided to hold a pleb-
iscite on the question. In spite of denial from the Federal
Government, they wanted to "consult the people as to their de-
sire for union." Matters relating to the foreign affairs were,
according to the constitution, withdrawn from the competence of
the Provincial Diet. But the Tirolese Diet explained that this
measure would not result in an;;/ action, it would only be done
with the purpose of guiding the Provisional government in its
future steps. The French Ambassador made a declaration to
Chancellor Mayr on behalf of his government. Ke demanded that
Austria live up to the terms of the Treaty of Saint Germain, and
made it clear that if the Austrian government did not discontin-
ue intrigues aiming at union with Germany, the French government
would abandon its plans for helping Austria. The British and
Italian governments supported this warning. But this allied ac-
tion instead of retarding Austria's desire for Union, actually
increased its tempo.
Dem.onstrations in Vienna became more frequent. An inter-
pellation of the Pan-German People's party explained their opin-
ion. There v/as no question of any intrigue. Was not Austria
already declared to be a member of the German realm in twsD solemn
constitutional laws? Did not Dr. Renner's report during negoti-
ations express a unanimous hope for union? This union could not
be permanently refused. The plebiscite v/as accordingly v;holly
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within the framework of the peace treaty. The objections of the
Allied Powers - especially France, aro"used the feeling in Austris
that a union would be the only worth while improvetnent in their
wretched existence. According to this oarty, Germany was not re-
sponsible for the union movement. The Austrian people were not
influenced by foreign pressure. The Anschluss-movement had"a-
risen simply from the need of the Austrian population, which is
seriously menaced in its vital interests." ^
During a debate in the National Council Chancellor Mayr ex-
pressed the attitude of the Austrian •;overnment . He explained
that assistance from foreiy;n povi/ers Vi/as absolutely necessary to
enable the reconstruction of Austria. The government had a righ;
to appeal to the League of Nations for permission to unite with
Germany - but the League could not possibly decide about union
and undertake rehabilitation at the same time. Austria, he main-
tained, should try first to ivrorove her condition with the a-
ssi stance of the League. If the League was unable to promise
help for essential reconstruction, then the government should
not hesitate to adopt the second legal method, allowed in Art.
88 of the peace treaty. Otherv^rise, "our country must collapse
entirely". His speech was followed by loud applause.
Socialist Deputy Bauer explained that the French declara-
tion was "an extraordinary encroachment upon our sovei^ p;nty .
"
The Austrian ri ^ht to self-determination was forbidden during
the oeace ne;,otiations - now, they felt, even free expression
1. Ibid. Contemporary Review. June 1921.
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of opinion was denied them. One favorable result of the pleb-
iscite agitabion was that ell Europe became aware of the immense
majority in Tirol in favor of the union. The Entente had been
given "the opportunity to demonstrate before the v/hole world
their respect for national freedom." But even if Prance and
her Allies could prohibit the expression of the will of a free
people "they can never turn the course of history with such pro-
hibitions". Loud applause greeted this statement from Deputy
Bauer, who continued by assuring his listeners that even if the
union were not accomplished now, Austrians should hold themselves
ready for future opportunities. He called the Austrians, who
wanted to remain separated from Germany and reestablish former
alliances "internal enemies". They failed to realize, he claimec,
that "our road can lead only to Germany and not back into any
kind of Habsburg conditions."
At the heic;^ht of demonstrations in Vienna, a group of pro-
fessional organizations adopted a resolution stating that Austria
was incapable of independent life. Credits, they insisted,
brought only temporary relief. Repeated disappointments had re-
sulted in loss of faith in the Entente. The people nov/ demanded
self-determination.
Chancellor Mayr, begging for time, pointed out that Germany
herself was "subject to terrible coercion" and advised the peopl<
to "have patience for a few more weeks", while they still were
dependent on foreign help for food supplies. On April 24, 1921
the Tirol plebiscite was held with 98.5 percent of the 134,318
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votes cast in favor of union v/ith G-ermany.
A similar plebiscite favoring union was held in Salzburg on
May 29, in spite of protests from the Federal Government and the
Allies.
A government crisis occurred and Schober became the Premier,
The situation had now become so desperate that any help was wel-
come. The Treaty of Lana betv^reen Czechoslovakia and Austria was
signed December 1921. Czechoslovakia extended to Austria a mod-
erate credit for the purpose of putting commercial intercourse
on a m.ore normal basis. In return, Austria pledged friendship
and neutrality in case of v/ar. This treaty offered no great ad-
vantages to Austria, but the Allies strongly ap^oroved this orien-
tation away from Berlin, in favor of Prague and a possible
Danubian Coni'ederatl on
.
Austria's new master was not the League or the Reparation
Commission but Czechoslovakia. The Lana treaty harmed the
Schober government now maintained in power only as long as for-
eign credits were available. The Pan-Germans could not forgive
him for this action.
After a year, the Schober ministries of "watchful waiting"
were replaced by Ignatz Seipel, a young Jesuit priest. He
assured the Germ.an Nationalist leaders that Austria would not
surrender her independence to foreign powers - and thus secured
their firm supoort for his projects. The life of a Cabinet
seemed to depend on how long an agreement with the Pan-German
Party could be m.aintained.
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Anschluss demonstrations became more insistent and more fre-
quent, as Austrians came to realize that their country could not
exist as an independent economic unit. Most of them would rathe'
join Germany than a Danubian Confederation. With t'ris fact in
mind Seipel went on his mission to Prague, Berlin, London and
other European caoitals witb the nurpose of coming to terms with
Austria's creditors. He told Lloyd George that if no help could
be assured "the financial problem has assumed a highly political
complexion; it has brought on the scene the Central European
problem," involving the very existence of Austria as an inde-
pendent State. Seipel threatened the great powers with
Anschluss, in spite of treaties, if nothing was done. A bank-
rupt country was shaking her fist at Europe's face.
Finally the League of Natl ons became aware of the serious-
ness of the problem. Instead of merely exoressing pious senti-
ments, the League realized that action was called for and pro-
ceeded accordingly. Austria's violent reaction to blind coer-
cion had. actually started a counter action. This incident proves
the old saying, "God helps those who help themselves."
As a res-ult of all this violent agitation, the Geneva
2Protocol was signed Oct. 4, 1922. This helped to clear the po-
litical horizon. The guarantor states - Prance, Britain, Italy
and Czechoslovakia - promised to give Austria reconstruction
1. Germains, V. vV., Austria of To-Day
,
1952. p 151
2, Leac>;ue of Nations, The Re storation of Austria, Geneva
Oct. 4, 1922. P. 59
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loans. They declared, in the Protocol, that they Vvould respect
the territorial independence, integrity and the soverinnty of
Austria. Av.stria renewed her promise p^iven in the Treaty of
Saint i^ermain, not to relinquish her political Independence and
never to surrender her economic independence.
The bourgeois parties in Austria voted in favor of ratifi-
cation of the Geneva Protocol, but the Social Democrats began a
tremendous campaign against Seipel and accused him of having
sold out his country to foreign capital. At this time Germany
was so involved with her own problems, that she vi/as unable to
come to Austria's aid.
In Decemjber of 1922, Dr. A. R. Zimmerman of Rotterdam, the
Commissioner-general, put the reconstruction schemie in force.
Under the pressure of a foreign commissioner general the Austria)|is
had to go much father in eliminating doles and subsidies and in
cutting dov/n the number of officials, than would have been the
case if the control of the reconstruction orogram had been left
in the hands of native narty-of f icials.
Before the loans began to flow in, the government, for thre
months, practically lived on credits and the hopes aroused by th
Geneva convention. Austria printed new notes v;ithout any more
security behind them than the public confidence, Vi/ith the cur-
rency at last statSlized, Austria realized how terribly poor she
had become.
Prom 1922 to 1926, Austria was so occupied with reconstruc-
tion, that Anschluss was temporarily forgotten. But in connec-
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tion with the Ruhr occupation in February 1923, Austrian express-
ions of sympathy for Germany were numerous and pointed. The
collapse of the German economic system almost coincided with the
improvement of Austria's economic life. French occupation of
Germany's richest mining district, heavy reparation payments and
a reckless issue of paper currency, pushed Germany nearer Com-
munisn than Austria had ever been.
While Germans struggled with their own bitter problems,
Austrians becariie accustomed to look upon foreign credits as a
sovereign remedy for every economic ill. They replaced the ear-
lier panacea - Anschluss with Germany. The assistance rendered
by the Leagijie was in the nature of temporary aid or emergency re-
lief to enable the population to live while the life of the na-
tion could be re-organized.
Two League of Nations experts, Layton and Rist, spent seven
weeks in Austria in 1925 to investigate conditions first hand.
Their report, dealing with Austria's "capacity to live"
(Lebensfahigkeit ) was very optimistic as to the possibility of
ultimate recovery.^ They found, that thanks to the initiative
of the manufacturers in adapting their products to nevi; marketing
conditions, industrial production had increased since 1922. In-
dustrial machinery had been modernized. Railroads were put on a
paying basis, with part of the railways electrified. This cut
down the importation of fuel. Production of agrarian goods, es-
1. League of Nations. The Economic Situation of Austria .
Rgport presented to the L'ouncll of the League of Nations
by W. T. Layton and Charles Rist. C.440 (1) M.162 (1) 1925 i: .
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pecially milk and vegetables, had also IncreBsed. The budget
was balanced more speedily t'-an was thoi:ght possible in 1922.
In 1923 the budget showed a deficit. But the budget of 1924
showed a surplus, which was devoted to covering a substantial
part of the capital expenditures. Since the League of Nations'
reform scheme vi^as initiated in the Autumn of 1922, the Austrian
currency had been stable. This economic progress afforded the
Financial Commission an opportunity to congratulate Austria. The
excellent results had gone beyond their expectations.
The work of financial reconstruction was now nearing its
end. Yet only one of the problems had been solved. There re-
mained an economic problem even more complicated than the one of
finance and currency. The Layton ann Rist report showed that
Austria possessed "all the necessary resources and has made re-
markable progress during the last few years. Much still remains
to be done in that sphere, however, as regards both the improve-
ment of conditions and the development of markets."
In spite of these favorable developments, Austrian unemiJloy-
ment was increasing. This waa due to limited markets and to the
introduction of more economical methods in industry, trade and
banking. However, the real difficulty revolved around the find-
ing of markets.
Recommendations were made to improve Austrian industrial
production to enable their products to compete with those of
other countries. The Succession States were advised to conclude
comriercial agreements among themselves. Other states were asked
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to facilitate Austrian production and trade. Preferential tar-
iffs were suggested, but no concrete proposals were made along
this line. Unfortunately, these recommendations remained a dead
letter.
Though the League failed to solve Austria's Industrial dif-
ficulties, when its control terminated in June 1926, it could
point to the stabilization of currency and a balanced budget.
The financial reconstruction of Austria under the auspices
of the League of Nations is often mentioned as one of the most
v/orthwhile examples of co-operative international effort. It
has been said in regard to Austria that "in all history of mod-
ern Europe no orderly country had ever sunk into such a quagmire
of wretchedness because of fiscal inflation, yet in no other has
international financial reconstruction been so successfully at-
tempted"."'' While Austria economically remained under Lea^^ue con
trol it was possible for her to preserve her sovereign rights in
a way v/hich would have been impossible under the financial pro-
tectorate of another country.
This removal of the financial control of the League of Na-
tions revived the Anschluss-movement. It was thought when Ger-
many became a member of the League that something definite might
be done about the union. Austrian leaders now expected further
collaboration v/ith Germany within the League of Nations.
Methods of cultural and legal cooperation were instituted
1, Graham, M. V.., New Governments of Central Europe, 1924. P. 1^5
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between Austria and Germany. This procedure of adaptation
(Angleichung ) included standardization of laws and judicial raeth-|
ods of administration, common educational organization, conces-
sions in regard to commercial privileges, the simplification of
passport regulations and other steps of unification within the
two countries, without calling it Anschluss. The Austro-German
Arbeitsgemeinschaft and a similar Volksbund had been organized
in 1925. These groups concentrated on propaganda for the
Anschluss. The two countries, having a common language and ed-
ucation, found few legal difficulties in economic cooperation.
According to the Minister of Justice of the German Reich,
the Union could not be prevented indefinitely, even though its
realization depended upon the unanimous consent of the League.
In his opinion the preparatory steps to standardize conditions
in Austria and Germany were very important. The Anschluss shoui
gradually be realized in a spirit of European conciliation, so
that when the two countries officially joined each other the
declaration of union would only be the recop;nition of an accom-
plished fact. The union should not be "Interpreted as a manifes
tation of imperialism. It is merely the fulfillment of a demo-
cratic demand. ... the consumation of a right, long withheld."
Anschluss demonstrations reached a climax, sentimentally,
during; the celebration of Schubert's musical festival in Vienna
in July 1928. Numerous speeches were delivered about the com-
1. Koch-Weser, E.
,
Germany in the Post-War World. 1950. P. 221.

mon German "blood brotherhood." Seipel and other political lead-
ers, for a long time had stressed the sentimental bonds between
Austria and Germany as being "bonds In a hi^i'her sense than polit-
ical ones." ^ They claimed that Austria is ar. purely a German
state as Saxony or Bavaria. Here it is well to remember that
though the language cf court, arm.y and bureaucracy is German,
the aristocracy is not a national German aristocracy. The Aus-
trian population is a mixture of Germans, Slavs and Magyars.
However, the Alpine Hinterland speaks only one ton^^^ue - German.
Lobe, the leader for the Austro-German Volksbund, spoke a-
bout "Wilson's vain effort to obtain right of self-determination
for the conquered countries". 2 Dr. Friedrich Hcrz stated that
"Austria's exports to Germany had Increased much faster in the
past few years than had her exports to the Succession States." ^
One of the main obstacles to the reconstruction of Europe, ac-
cording to Dr. Hjalmar Schacht was the "policy of economic iso-
lation practiced by many European states since the war." ^
1. Ball, M. M. Post -War German- Austrian Relations. 1936. P. 92.
2. Ibid. P. 71
3. Ibid. P. 69
4. Ibid. P. 96

Ch. V. World Disorder and Claims for
Revl sion of the Peace Treaties .
By the close of the year 1929 Austria seemed to have solved
the most difficult of the problems arising from the partition of
her former Empire. Her most serious remaining problem - the es-
tablishment of adequate foreign trade, made her peculiarly vul-
nerable to the v;orld-wide economic crisis. Every succeeding
crisis revived the idea of union vtiith Germany. The depression o;'
1929 was no exception.
The causes that disrupted world finance and commerce were
just a large edition of the destructive influences that torment-
ed the Danubian basin, and Austria in particular. Blake termed
it "a relative over production of an important group of primary
commodities." ^ The war industries had doubled 'the v/orld's
manufacturing capacity. He also proclaimed the crisis due to
"failure to observe the conditions necessary for the successful
functioning of the International Gold Standard." Monetary dis-
order and post-war over speculation were undoubtedly a contribu-
ting factor.
According to Keynes, previous to the World V,/ar I, curren-
cies v/ere maintained on a "stable basis in relation to gold and
one another." ^ The flow of capital and trade was easy. That
vast conflict, the second phase of v.hich v;e are fighting today,
1. Blake, H. , VJorld Disorder and Reconstruction. 1932. P. 14.
2. Keynes, J.M., The Economic Consequences of the Peace. 1920
P. lb;
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upset both ^old. and moral values. Another cause often mentioned
was the influence of War Debts and Reparations. All this added
to the load that finally brought on the climax to the crisis,
the Wall Street crash.
Several factors gave ample v/arning of the coming debacle.
The steady world wide increase of unemployment, and the enormous
number of bankruptcies were the two most important signs of
future trouble.
Another index to the coming storm may be found in the
falling wholesale prices, illustrated in the following chart of
Rotterdam price drops given in percentage of fall.^^
Average per Year
1930 Compared 1930 Compared Dec. 1930 Compared
Products with 1929 with 1928 with Dec. 1929
VVTieat 21^ 28^ 44^
Rye 43^ 53^ 54^
Corn 38^ 51^ 44^
Return to tariff protection was one of the solutions ad-
2
vocated by Switzerland. But these tariff barriers were ex-
plained as "das wesentliche Verteilungs hindernis auf dem
Weltmarkt." ^
Due to the fact that conditions in Austria were poor to be-
gin with, unemployment reached staggering proportions.
1. Renatus, K. Die Zwolf te Stunde der \7eltwirt schaf
t
1931. P. 21
2. Berliner Tageblatt. March 5, 1931.
3. Renatus, K. , Die Zwolf te Stunde der Weltwirtschaf t . 1931 P. 47
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Until now, the deficit had been partly compensated by that
"invisible export" represented by the spending of foreign tour-
ists. But the crisis curtailed even that source of income.
What to other countries was a "depression" to Austria became a
complete collapse. Since other peoples were also busily endeav-
oring to help themselves out of this economic chaos, Austrians
now found little s;^Tiipathy wherever they turned. Desperately
they went back to their old cure all - Anschluss.
Germany's response to this pathetic apoeal from Austria
can be understood onl;/ by a study of Germany's own economic
vicissitudes. Following the depression of 1924-26, American
loans caused a short-lived boom that ended with the collapse of
1927. The Reichsmark wobbled uncertainly, unemployment became
acute, thus Austria was allowed to drift helplessly in the con-
fusion of her ovm troubles.
The unexpected victory of the National Socialist party in
1930 caused an atmosphere of uncertainty. This political and
economic uncertainty reached its peak in 1931 when a crisis in
Germany's financial situation occurred. Lack of confidence
caused investors to withdraw their credits both from Austria and
Germany. Capital exporting countries restricted their loans.
This resulted in a general s]'orta-:"e of caoital. Banks failed.
Business life was paralyzed.
At the conference of the reparation experts at Paris, Dr.
Schacht referred to the territorial provisions of the Versailles
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Treaty. He stressed the Importance of revising some of the
stipulations of the Peace treaties. He pointed out that the
basis of Germany's economic life needed to be fortified if the
country's efforts to pay reparations were to be made effective.
Germany, he claimed, had been deprived of her overseas reservoir
and her domestic supply of raw materials was greatly reduced.
On the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Peace Treaty
of Versailles, Germany prepared large scale demons cratlons in
protest against the treaty. Germany had a legal basis in asking
for revision of the Treaty of Versailles, through Article XIX of
the Covenant. Moreover, the Germans were absolutely convinced
that they had a moral ri:;:;ht to demand a revision of unendurable
conditions. They pointed Vi/ilson's view point that the purpose
of the Covenant and Article XIX should be to provide for a
machinery through which the terras of the treaties could be al-
tered v;hen conditions had been changed, or when it could be
shown that injustice had been done. This was a provision for
the peaceful settlement of International problems by discussion
and consent.
If Article XIX provided for revision, there was, however,
another Article in the Covenant altogether overshadowing the
Revision clause. Article X assured status quo. On this clause
Prance relied for her national security. French fear of s pos-
sible German aggression and subsequent thxreat to her security,
vetoed any attempt to revise the treaty and strengthen Germany.
1. Wertheimer, M.S., "Revision of the Versailles Treaty".
For. Pol. Ass. Vol V. No. 8. 1929. "
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In a speech delivered before the American Foreign Policy
Association in New York, Mendelsohn Bartholdy advocated the re-
vision of the Versailles Treaty as essential for a real and just
peace in Europe."'' This revision v^"as not only demanded by German
but by all of Central Europe as well. Some clamored for access
to the sea. Others rectific- tion of boundaries, all were angry
and dissatisfied. All sought self-determination and more living
space at the expense of others. The Little Entente, consisting
of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania, w^as bound to France
v/ith Defensive Alliances and non-aggression treaties, for the
purpose of preserving the status quo and to prevent the restora-
tion of the Habsburgs.
The pressure of Prance and her satellites to prevent the
union of Germany and Austria, brought forth many proposals to
alleviate the Central European distress. But this blind desire
to maintain the status quo at all cost cripnled the projects
even before they were applied.
The effort by the League of Nations to establish a customs
truce in 1927, failed mainlv because Prance and her allies were
2
unv^illing to abandon their traditional policy. This customs
truce might have opened markets for some products, but would not
have solved the agricultural problems of the Danube states.
1. Berliner Tageblatt, March 4, 1931
2. Dean, V. M.
,
"European Efforts for Economic Collaboration".
For. Pol. Rep. Vol. VII. No. 12. Aug. 19, 1931
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A number of Customs Unions were planned to amalgamate into
a single large unit, territories with mutually complementary
economic resources and needs. The Danube Confederation was a-
gain proposed by Czechoslovakia to prevent further economic
crisis and the Austro-German Anschluss. Every economic question
in Europe seemed to stir up a corresponding political controversy.
A series of international conferences were held 1930-1931
to establish a European Union in close collaboration with the
League of Nations. The Commission of Enquiry for European Union
recommended the enforcement of a custom.s truce proposed March
1930, Iceland, Turkey and the U.SJS.R. were invited to partici-
pate in the discussions over the agrarian crisis."'"
2Briand' s European Union proposed in his project memoran-
dum of May 1930, outlined an organization of European states to
solve European problems. Robert Cecil was unwilling to accept
the usefulness of Briand's vague proposals to remedy existing
unfavorable conditions. Though Briand deplored the erection of
20,000 km, of nev/ customs barriers in post-war Europe, he sav\r no
reason v/hy local customs unions should be formed, even if region-
al understandings were recommended by the Covenant of the League
of Nations,
Germany was immediately willing and ready to cooperate, "No
country can feel the defects in the structure of Europe more
strongly than Germ.any who, situated as she is in the centre of
1. League of Nations. Monthly Summary . Vol. XI. 1931. P. 84.
2. Stone, '^-i . T., "The Briand Project for European Union"
For, Pol, Rep. Vol. VI, No. 14, Sept. 17, 1950

the continent, is specially affected by these v/eaknesses and
their consequences. No country has a greater interest than
Germany in the removal of these defects. The German Government
is therefore very ready to cooperate in the solution of the prob
lem and is willing to take part in an exhaustive discussion dur-
ing the meeting of the League of Nations next Autumn" states a
German document relating to the European union.
A constructive policy for European reorganization was im-
peratively necessary for Gennany and Austria. In order to safe-
guard the endangered political and economic peace of the contin-
ent, the European leaders were now anxious to erect on a wider
European basis, an organization similar to the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire. Briand's vague conceotions of a European
Union were, however, too slow and unrealistic for Austria who
required an immediate solutionof her problems. This talk about
a European Federation was instituted not only to take the minds
of people away from the depression, but to safeguard Prance by
discouraging Austro-German Anschluss.
The Anschluss, reasoned French politicians, was opposed to
the spirit of Pan-Europe. First, they insisted, Austria and
Germany should join a European Federation, then as federated
states within the union, they could adjust their economic and
political affairs. The only difficulty was the lack of this
European Federation.
1. Ball, M. M., Post-'i/Var German-Austrian Relations. 1956. P. 104.
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Discussing the possibilities of Anschluss taking place upon
the recoinmendations of the League of Nations, Graham stated that
"even if a reunion with Germany becomes possible the economic
interests of Austria in the Danube area will continue. It can-
not be abolished without the abolition of Austria herself"."^
Dr. Karl Janovsky in his treatment "Anschluss oder Donau-
foderation" believes that the economic Danube federation never
2
can become a reality without the German Reich. Austria prom-
ised that she never would join any political group which ex-
eluded Germany. Vihile Benes declared, in Berlin 1928, "Anschluss
means v/ar" ,
To support their ov;n obscure, selfish reasons that they
dared not expose to vi/orld scrutiny, the European statesmen in
power, consistently blocked every attempt to change existing
conditions. Apparently the world can only make progress by
shedding blood,
A revision of the peace treaties, most persons admitted,
was necessary to help restore prosperity to Europe. But when it
came to the actual accomplishment of this necessity, scores of
exciises v/ere advanced to prevent it. Never was the statement,
that language was msd e to hide thought, truer than during the
interminable discussions over the Danubian controversies.
1. Graham, M. W., New Governments of Central Europe . 1924. P. 200
2. Kleinwachter, F.P.G., Die Anschlussfrage, 1950. P. 214.
3. Newe Freie Presse. June 2, 1928.
4. Foester, F. 'A'
.,
"Germany and Austria: A European Crisis"
Foreign Affairs. July. 1951.
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Ch. VI. The Vienna Protocol .
Though apparently lonp: In coming, retarded by riimsy but-
tresses that gave imj one after the other, disaster finally
struck unhappy Austria. Schober was called to office as Chancel-
lor at a most critical moment to face the collapse of the Boden-
Credit Anstalt, and the menace of civil war.
Referring to Schober' s adventures in 1921, when he was the
police chief of Vienna, and leader of the Pan-Germans, Dr. Otto
Bauer wrote, "the bourgeoisie attempted so to twist events as to
prove that the Vienna Police and Schober, their Chief, saved
Vienna from Bolshevism"."'" When the Treaty of Lana was signed,
during his premiership, he lost the support of the Pan-German
Party, which acted as the balance v/heel in the form.atlon of
Austrian coalition cabinets. This rapproach e raent with Czech-
oslovakia gave the Anschluss-movement a hard blow. In 1922 he
was throv/n out of oCfice during a budget crisis. But now after
seven ^/ears, he reappeared on the political sta~e stronger than
ever, v;ith a moderate and able cabinet.
Schober realized that it was useless to appeal to the
great Powers for help, unless Austria herself was ready to set
her house in orr-er. At the same time, when Briand delivered his
proposal for a Europear Union, Dr. Schober described his future
p
commercial policy. He emphasized that Austria could not wait
1. Gerraains. V. Vi'., Austria of To-Day. 1952. P. 85.
2. New York Tim.es. March 22, 1951
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until Pan-Europe was realized. He keenly noted that so far only
good intentions had been voiced. There were no concrete pro-
posals- no treaties, no concessions... just endless promises and
talk. Austria needed an immediate solution. He proposed that
regional ap;reements should take place between agrarian and in-
dustrial states with complementary economic Interests. This plan
was welcomed by Curtins,^ the German Foreign Minister.
Schober offered Reciprocal Free Trade to Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia and Hungary, but the offer was declined by all. Firs;
among the European leaders openly to blame the tariffs as the
root of their troubles, Schober suggested a remedy. In his opin-'
ion, better orgsrlzation of European economy must begin with re-
gional agreements.
In March 1931, the German Chancellor Brtinlng had planned to
visit Vienna. He was, however, de bailed and Foreign Minister
Cur tins and the Secretary of State Punder, went in his place.
Thus was born the Vienna Protocol.
On the 3rd of March they arrived in Vienna. "die Wiener
Neuesten Nachrichten" informs us that ''this visit is more than
just a formality between friends - it is a decree of fate against
all oppositional powers who are tryln,fr to prevent two peoples,
that belong together, from working together.*^ Others v^ent so
far as to say that tJ-is meeting might relieve all of Europe's
1. Dean, V. M., "European Efforts for Economic Collaboration"
For. Pol. Rep. Vol. VII. No. 12. Aug. 19, 1931
2. Berliner Tageblatt. March 3, 1931.

suffering. Curtius had a difficult task to accomplish. The
Austrian and German newspapers were filled with news items about
this significant event. Curtius visited the German treasure
chamber in which the archives from the old German "Kai serreichs"
are kept. The press gave a glowing description of German solid-
arity - "eine hohe Einheit ist in diesen Dingen."-^ "Die Arbeiter
Z'eitung" writes, "that even if Anschluss is not possible today,
we can always work for closer economic relations, with the pur-
pose of bringing the two countries nearer to a common political,
economic and judicial unity."
According to German reports, some days later, the visit to
Vienna seemea to nave been very satisfactory. Some weeks latejp
the world-press devoted large sections to discussions on the
Austro-German Customs Union proposal,
Austria welcomed the project, but hoped that the plan would
not be misunderstood. They explained such a union was only the
first step in the formation of the Pan European Union proposed
by Br land. No one Vi/ould be excluded from the union. Head-
lines in the Austrian Press stressed that the independence of
both coimtries would be unimpaired. Commercial treaties pre-
viously made with third states would in no way be changed. The
customs union was to be purely economic. There would be no po-
litical consequences whatever - thus allowing the union to be
1. Berliner Tageblatt. March 3, 1951
2. Ibid. March 7, 1931
3. Neue Preie Presse. March 21, 1931

put into force without any difficulties.
The complete text of the Vienna Protocol was published
March 23."^ The proposal consisted of twelve articles. The
first assured that absolute independence would be preserved and
obligations to third states would be respected. This was a con-
tract initiating a new order by regional agreements. Similar
agreements could be made with other states. Article II containe
i
provisions for later agreement upon customs laws. Both parties
should agree when laws were to be altered. According to Article
III no duties should be levied during the duration of the union,
both governments should decide what intermediate tariffs were
advisable. Article IV treated p)rovisional regulations of "turn-
over taxes" and monopolies. Customs administration should be
separate but execution of the laws should be uniform according
to Article V. Article VI described methods of collecting duties
by the respective countries, separately. Special costs should bo
deducted and the total sum divided according to a fixed quota
between the partners. Special national ri'ihts should not be in-
fringed. Article VII states that no import or export transit
prohibitions should exist between Germany and Austria except as
required for protection of public safety, etc. (A detailed list
follows). According to Article VIII a treaty v/ill regulate
rights of "natural and juridical persons". Rights to conclude
treaties v/ith other states Is provided for in Article IX. These
treaties with a third state should not violate the purpose of
1. New York Times. March 24, 1931.
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the Protocol or conflict with its content; as far as posd.ble
they should be negotiated jointly. Article X wished to see othe
com^Tiercial treaties regulated according to this treaty. An im-
partial arbitration commission representing both countries shoul
settle disputes arising from interpretation and application of
treaty stipulations. Decisions should be binding. With a six
months' notice the treaty could be terminated. Special provis-
ions in regard to ratification and termination are given in the
last article.
The treaty seemed to have been constructed with the thought
of preserving Austria's independence. Article IX was included
chiefly to guarantee this independence. It did not establish a
closed economic system, since the parties expressed their willin
ness to enter into negotiations with third states for similar
agreements. There was no provision for complete free trade.
Duties were removed only from some commodities. Internal duties
"Zwi ^chenzolle" , were to be used until conditions had been ad-
justed. Austria even undertook to furnish receipts of her to-
bacco monopoly and her customs as securities for the Reconstruc-
tion Loan of 1925."^
The Vienna Protocol was described by its authors as purely
economic in character. But it was an entering wedge; for econom
ic union suggested political cooperation and eventual absorption
of Austria into the Reich. With a jealous eye Prance and the
Little Entente regarded this as pre-nuptial engagement. They
1. Dean, V.M., "European Efforts for Economic Collaboration".
For. Pol. Rep. Vol. VII. No. 12. Aug. 19, 1931.
i

again revived stories of a United States of Europe as an effort
to prevent closer contact and final marriage of Germany and
Austria. French statesmen failed to grasp the true import of
the Vienna Trotocol. They did not or vifould not see the solution
of economic problems through a bilateral agreement.
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Ch. VII. Opinion s in the World Press .
According to press reports. It appears as if France and
Czechoslovakia were more interested in the Customs Union questioj|i
than Austria and Germany. Paris and Prague already feared
the development of Central Europe under German domination.
France became alarmed over this gravest act of Germany since the
war.
The socialistic "Soir"-'- said that the proposal caused wild
excitements among the adherents of the Versailles Treaty. It
proved to be a very painful surprise for France. This was a
serious violation of the status quo. France appeared bewildered
by the sudden turn of events. Her carefully planned system of
loans and alliances was tottering and about to crash. Almost
all her leaders voiced alarm and fear. Sauerwein in the
"Matin"^ was convinced that the plan was the first step towards
Anschluss. Herriot supported this opinion, seeing it only as an
excuse for a political union.
Paris firmly believed that the union initiated an attempt
to establish a Mittel-Europa along the lines proposed by Fried-
rich Naiamann and other German writers. The development of the
Prussian Zo liver ein was recalled and now a similar outcome was
prophesied. The statement that Germany and Austria v/ere preparecj.
to conclude similar treaties with other states stimulated rather
than quieted French opposition.
1. Berliner Tageblatt. March 23, 1931.
2. - Neue Freie Presse. March 25, 1931.
3. Berliner Tageblatt. March 26, 1931.
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Some day"when Europe is absent minded or occupied elsewhere
Austria might proclaim her adhesion to Germany", M. Francois
Albert warned the French Chamber of Deputies in 1928.'^ But the
violent storm of criticism, charges and accusations finally sub-
sided. Briand' s diplomatic skill made the most of an awkward
situation. The same day Curtins went to Vienna, Briand declared
that all danger of Anschluss had disappe ared. Three weeks later
Briand contented himself with condemning the manner in which the
Vienna Protocol had been announced, as a fait accompli and as a
challenge to the plan for European Union,
The plan which had been advocated and discussed for years,
when finally applied caused a furore, as though unexpected and
never heard of. Briand was blamed for not anticipating this ste]
The Customs Commission of the French Chamber of Deputies protest'
ed against the Union on economic grounds, and presented a documei
to Premier Laval asking him to do everything to prevent the con-
clusion of the Union. Laval answered with a speech lauding the
Versailles Treaty. He v;as applauded by Pertinax and the Con-
2
servative Press.
Briand defended his attitude in the French Senate by point-
ing out, that Austria, under the peace- treaty, had no right
to conclude the Vienna Protocol. But, he admitted that France
could not be satisfied with only criticism, of the plan. France
1. Wertheimer, M. S., "Revision of the Versailles Treaty"
For. Pol. Ass. Information Service. Vol. V. No. 8. June 26
1929.
2. Berliner Tageblatt. May 4, 1951.
3. Dean, V .M .." European Efforts for Economic Collaboration"
For. Pol. Rep. Vol .VTT. "Wn. ^9.. Anp-. IQ, 1 Qro
It

62.
herself was not altogether free from blame. Her Eastern Europea:i
Allies were starving while France only paraded her strength and
her wealth, throwing a few millions here and there to keep them
happy. A constructive counter proposal - a French plan had to
be made. The vote of confidence of 419 to 43, at the end of the
debate, was a great victory for Briand.
French nationalists said that the move might not have been
made if Mainz had been held.-'- They, according to "Ordre" were
ready to occupy the Rhineland, just as Clemenceau had done before !.
2Pertinax in "L'Echo de Paris" represented an extreme viev/. He
demanded that economic pressure should be used to abolish the
work of Schober and Curtius, - or if needed, the withdrawal of
French credits.
More moderate viev;s were voiced in the socialist press,
especially the "Populaire" and the "Republique" . Leon Blum ad-
mitted that the French Press was too excited. He was convincec.
that the realization of this plan would not lead to Anschluss,
but to a United States of Europe. He hoped that the plan would
be supported rather than condemned. " Oeuvre" insisted that this
alarming union was caused primarily b;. the French commercial pol-
icy. ^ Regional agreements, this newspaper admitted, would be
the best way of achieving a European Union.
The government at Prague was also greatly disturbed by this
1. Neue Freie Presse, March 25, 1931
2. Berliner Tageblatt, March 24, 1931
5. Berliner Tageblatt, March 24, 1931
i. Neue Freie Presse, March 23, 1931
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Customs Union. The official declarationsfrom Dr. Benes carce firlfet
when the rest of Europe already had expressed its opinion. Mean
while "Narodni Li sty" reminded Prague that the government had,
some weeks ago, issued a warning that Austria and Germany would
present to the world a fait accompli.
Dr. Benes, in his speech of April 23rd, stressed the fact
that the Customs Union was eminently of a political character.
No one really believed that this v/as a purely economic deal. Dr
Benes now feared that his country would become isolated, but de-
nied that the policy of the Little Entente was merely an instru-
ment of French policy. It was only an instrument of equilibrium
he insisted, and an upholder of status quo in Central Europe. He
denied that his proposal for a Danube Federation was an attempt
to lure Austria into joining a combination directed either eco-
nomically or politically against Germany or any other country.
Benes believed that the granting of exclusive advantages to one
state threatened Austria's independence. He recalled that no
country joining the German Zollver.ein could maintain its sov-
ereignty. He also denounced the union as a violation of the mos
favored- nation treaties - the keystone of the European economic
system. This union would make a European solution of the crisis
impossible and would lead to a violent economic war. This was
not a regional agreement in the Geneva sense. In fact it was
not, according to Benes, a Customs Union at all since it provided,
for internal duties. For Austria this kind of a union would meaiji
"raisi.ng the cost of living, increased unemployment, increased

dissatisfactions of the middle classes and of labor, and new
social unrest." ^
Austrian duties would be raised to the German level through
this "Vertrag zur Anglelchung der zoll-und handels-politischen
Verhal tail s sen' . Germany, according to another Czechoslovakian
economist, would not reduce some of her duties on grain, at this
tiv^e the highest in Europe. Finally, Germany could put seriou i
obstacles in the way of goods coming from states not joining the
union. Normal transportation could be disturbed by artificial
means. The railway system of Germany and Austria would be unitec.
as a natural consequence of this Union. High freight rates coul:.
be charged for the transport of foreign goods over short distance
and cheap rates for transport of home goods over long distance.
Protectionist tendencies could thus be made even more effective
when expressed In railway tariff discriminations than in customs
duties. This kind of protectionism is used In many countries
and would most certainly be a part of the Austro-German program.
As a result of previous efforts at mutual economic adapta-
tion between Austria and Germany, a railway traffic order had
3been agreed upon and came Into force In October, 1928.
According to Bitterman's "Austria and the Customs Union",
this union would affect bonds between Austria and non-German
1. Benes, E. , The Austro-German Customs Union Project. 1951. P. 4..
2. Argus, The Economic Aspect of the Austro-German Customs
TJnIon . 1031. ^p. 10*^5:
3. Argus, The Economic Asoe ct of the Austro-German Customs
TTnToir:;— . p. .

Central Europe. Trade via Hamburg would be promoted. This
would seriously affect Trieste, Austria's nearest seaport. Swiss
railroads would lose a large part of their transit traffic.
Bitterman was certain that the union wouH reflect unfavor-
ably on the entire economic life of Europe. Czechoslovakia,
standing only second to G-ermany in her trade relations with
Austria, would suffer the most. Polish and Czechoslovakian coal
would be unable to compete with German Ruhr coal on the Austrian
market. The economic existence of the Eastern states woi^ld be
menaced by economic pressure from Germany and this would force
them either to form an economic union of their ov/n, or join m'ith
Germany.
According to a German economist, twenty-five percent of
Austria's unfavorable trade balance in 1930 was due to her deal-
ings with Czechoslovakia. "Von Anfang an war das Streben Prags
darauf gcrichtet, sich das osterreichische Absatzgebiet zu
sichern, ohne ent sprechende Konzessionen zu gewahren."-^ Czecho-
slovakia according to this statement tried to make Prague and
Pressburg financial centers at the expense of Vienna.
Czechoslovakian statesmen and economists, were unanimously
of the opinio!
,
that the union would not help Austria. Benes,
Argus and Bitterman were certain that before mutual adaptation
could take place, many Austrian industries would perish and many
would be taken over by Germany. Moreover, Austria would lose a
large part of her foreign market in favor of Germany. Banking
1. Leibrock, 0., Deutschland im Weltpolitischen Geschehen.
-msT.
—
m.6'2

and insurance business would decrease and become dependent on
Berlin. They prophesied that unemployment would increase and th
5
commercial importance of Vienna would decline - in favor of a
greater Berlin. The world would be separated from Berlin and
Vienna by higher tariffs. As for their own solution it was the
same old story - Pan European Cooperation. The Czechs proclaime i
this would result in permanent improvement. To begin with, they
advised stabilization of industrial duties, followed by a grad-
ual reduction of customs duties, and leading to a real
"Angleichung" all over Europe. The improvements that Germany
was endeavoring to achieve in Central Europe, should be applied
to the entire continent.
To this, many influential Germans agreed. "Verwirklichung
der Grundidee der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa" promised Dr.
Curtins as Germany's goal. He explained in the "Matin"^ that
Germany was the state most interested in the realization of Pan-
Europe, and was ready to work with all her power for the peace-
ful unification of Europe. He referred to t he failure of former
attempts for economic organizations in a continent where countrifs
are separated from each other not only by one, but by dozens of
Chinese walls. Little improvement, he stated, could be accom-
plished through collective agreements. It was very difficult,
almost impossible, to satisfy so many countries with their dif-
ferent interests in a single treaty, at least in such a serious
economic crisis as the present. A European union, according to
1. Neue Preie Presse. March 23, 1931.
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Dr. Curtius, could take place only after a long preparation and
much labor. Briand's program would eventually be accomplished
if regional agreements first were concluded. The different
•spheres of interest could later on be combined to one large
union. The Vienna Protocol was planned to help realize Briand's
Pan-Europe. Curtitis reiterated, "einer Idee , die nicht rsar die
wirtschaf t 1 iche Einigung, sondern auch die Konsoli d ierung des
Priedens in Europa und in der Welitzum Z'iele hat." .But few men
in the countries immediately surrounding G-erraany believed this
statement or followed his reasoning. However, editorial writers
of England and America in many instances supported Germany's
viewpoint.
The idea of an Aus tro-German Customs Union was said to have
originated in Austria.-^ But another version said that the pro-
posal was made by Germany to use the "prospect of an economic
union with Austria as a bargaining point in future negotiations
with Prance".*^ Some of the 21 million marks, provided by the
German budget, and admitted by Stresemannas used to extend "das
Deutschtum" outside the Reich, may have had something to do with
3this union proposal. This detail, is, however, not of great
importance.
The Vienna Protocol was hailed by the German Press as a
landmark in the history of German diploniacy. It was the first
1. Berliner Tageblatt. March 21, 1931.
2. Dean, V.M., "European Efforts for Economic Collaboratioi
"
Por. Pol. Rep. Vol. VII. No. 12. Aug. 19, 1931.
3. V/ertheimer, M.S., "Revision of the Versailles Treaty."
Por. Pol. Ass. Information Service. Vol. V. No. 8. June 26] 20,

independent step Germany had t: ken since 1918. Prance v/as blamep
in a German editorial by Dr. Max Jordan for tryin,^; to maintain
herself as t^e dictator of Europe by continuously referring to
the Peace Treaty of Versailles.-'- She could dominate Europe
only as long as Austria and Germany were separated.. Dr. Jordan
insisted that France objected to the union only because she
feared a greater Germany and the resulting shift in the balance
of power. German youth refused to be suppressed by the burdens
of a past war and rebelled at the idea of continued subjugation.
Many Germans even questioned France's sincerity in her counter
proposals. They doubted that these plans were realistic enou^
to be used as a basis for further negotiations.
However, even in Germany some voic-es were raised against
the Protocol. Liberal organs like "Berliner Tageblatt" and
Frankfurter Feitung" were slightly impatient with Germany'
s
procedure and the abrupt announcement of the proposal. The
"Reichspost" thought that the German press ought to have been
more reserved in its statements.
Professor Franz Eulenberg (Berlin) admitted Germany's need
for world trade, but denied that the Customs Union would give
2
such excellent results as described by certain experts. He
warned that the union would not provide Germany with a greater
market. He advised Germany to encourage commercial relations
with the whole world. "Vje need above all raost-f avored-nation
1. Berliner Tageblatt. May 15, 1931.
2. Bitterman, M. , Austria and the Customs Union. 1931. P. 90,
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treati es"
.
Certain optimists in Vienna, who thoup;ht the union would be
realized speedily, on later consideration became more sober. Dr
1
Schober gave his opinion in an interview to forei/^n corresponden-
He stated that the proposed c istoms union would improve the con-
ditions of Central Europe and stressed that the project certain-
ly was not illeg-al. While drafting the regulations of customs
agreement, Curti.us and Schober constantly bore in mind the stip-
ulations of the peace treaties and the first Geneva Protocol.
Schober also hoped that Germany and Prance would work together
and not fight each other.
Austrians did not favor this proposal unanimously. It was
opposed by certain Austrian industrialists who feared German
competition. Austrian industry was small-scale and relatively
undeveloped - Germany's was large-scale and highly organized.
To offset this handicap certain duties should be maintained to
allow Austrian industries involved to make necessary adjustments,
Austrian Communists were opposed to economic union with Germany,
as an invention of German caoitalism, and the Monarchists opposec
it because a union with Germany would give the death blow to any
hope of restoring the Habsburg dynasty.
When the first wave of emotionalism had subsided in Austria,
voices were heard denouncing the Customs Union as of doubtful
wisdom and premature.
1. Neue Preie Presse. March 51, 1931.

The Austrians feared that their beloved Vienna with all her
groat traditions would be reduced to the status of a German pro-
vincial town. Vienna, resembling Paris more than Berlin, is a
cosmopolitan capital with a strong Jewish influence in commercia!.
and journalistic circles acting as an internationalizing factor.
Vienna's large population depended on a complicated system of
banking, trade and industry, that was geared to the requirements
of a great nation, Vi/ith the Empire cut off, the great capital
was not adapted to little Austria.
Czechoslovakian commentators frequently pointed out that
Vienna, in case of a Customs Union with Germany, would lose its
importance as an independent, industrial and banking centre and
would cea^-e to be the headquarters of an independent economic
territory.
The easy going Austrians disliked their sterner North-Ger-
man cousins. They lacked the competitive spirit and the effic-
iency of Prussia. The Austrians during centuries of intercourse
with the Balkan nations had developed a mental attitude more sim-
ilar to the sunny ard mellow civilization of the Mediterranean.
An observer during the last war describing the contrast once
said, "Berlin is optimistic but gloomy; Vienna is pessimistic
but cheerful."
Many Austrians regarded the Prussians as stiff martinets.
The strictly centralized German Government was disliked. On the
other hand the m.atter-of -fact North Germans had little patience
with the well-known"Gemutlichkei t" of the Austrians.
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In studying the reaction of these two capitals, London and
Washington could be compared. Most Englishmen might be in favor
of reciprocal free trade with the United States, but few would
agree to a political union in which their rights to manage their
own affairs would be sacrificed. Neither would Americans con-
sent if the tables were turned. Most civilized communities re-
bel at the conception of political subjugation. Austrians were
no exception. They could not bear to see Vienna completely sub-
merged under the domination of Bex'lin. Hov/ever, it should be
remembered that political union had not yet occurred. Still,
many feared the consequences of commercial unity.
In spite of these misgivings and uncertainty about the fu-
ture, the majority of the Austrians waited for a favorable op-
portunity to claim Anschluss.
Among Europe's small nations Hungary seemed to be the one
most in favor of the Customs Union. Premier Bethlen had been
Informed about the project previous to its public announcement.
He said that Hungary eventually might adhere to this new economi
combination.
Polish opinion was very skeptical in regard to the purpose
of the Vienna Protocol. The adoption of this plan would consid-
erably reduce Poland's favorable trade balance in relation to
Austria. She was also afraid of losing her traditional friend-
ship with Prance, when new hostile barriers were laid between
them. An editorial in the "Kurier Poranny" took a neutral atti-
1. New York Times. March 22, 1931.
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tude."^ It reminded its readers that Poland had no rir^ht to ap-
ply pressure on Austria. "Every man Is the architect of his own
fortune and should be left alone." Warsaw tried hard to main-
tain p;ood relations with all of Europe.
Mussolini hesitated to express his opinion. This caused th|)s
German press to believe that he did not oppose the proposal. 2
"Popolo d' Italia" stated that a Customs Union would constitute
a pressure on the Italian frontiers of the Brenner Pass. Austri
furthermore had vital interests in Trieste, once her only port.
"Italy would be afraid to have Grossdeutschland as her neighbor"
3
wrote a German historian. Italy by strengthening her trade
relations with many small countries had gradually built up a
large market. A German expansion in the Balkans would abolish
Italy's influence here, the result of years of hard work.
The Prime Minister of Bulgaria told the New York Times
•correspondent, that his country was in favor of the project and
every other plan that might change the peace treaties."^ Rumania
and Yugoslavia seemed to be very cautious and reserved. Accord-
ing to" Jugoslowenski Glassnik" the proposal did not alarm
Belgrade.
^
The Russian "izvestia" was in favor of the project. The
1. Berliner Tageblatt. March 25, 1951.
2. Ibid. March 23, 1931.
3. Liebrock, 0., Deutschland in Weltpoli ti schen Geschehen. 1932
P. 163
4. New York Tim.es. March 26, 1931.
5. Berliner Tageblatt. March 28, 1931.
»

U.S.S.R. was interested in an Anti-Versailles bloc and saw in
Pan-Europe a menace to their Communism. The capitalist rule
would be in grave danger if Pan-Germany expanded, a fact that
afforded Russia great satisfaction.-^
Switzerland saw final realization of the Anschluss as the
2
purpose of this proposal. It would mean that Switzerland
might become a battlefield between Prance and the Southeastern
Europe, dominated by Germany. German competition with Switzer-
land on the industrial market would also increase.
Most Americans, who at the peace conferences, gave the
Anschluss dispute any thought - favored union between Austria
and Germany. They could not understand why many European nations
tried to prevent something so natural and inevitable.
The New York Times declared the Vienna Protocol a courageous
step, one of the most important developments in post-war Europe,
Public men and economists had for 7/ears urged for action and
begged for the lowering of tariff rates in Europe. Conferences
and committees achieved nothing. Briand had been putting po-
litical considerations before economic realities. Now the first
practical and p-urely economical step had been taken. Germany ani
Austria were making a definite beginning. Vi/hile others were
fumbling they had the courage to "raze the whole structure in-
stead of taking a brick here and there off the tariff wall."
1. New York Times. March 25, 1931.
2. Berliner Tageblatt. March 25, 1951.
3. New York Times. March 25, 1951

Even with the example of the Zallvereln in mind with the subse-
quent birth of the German Empire, it did not necessarily follow
that political union must succeed economic cooperation. More-
over, modification of the Treaty of Versailles v/ould make any
reasonable development perfectly legal. While others "waited
and debated" - Germany and Austria had acted. This was an in-
structive example for other nations. The New York Times con-
cluded its article by advising the Washington government - "go
you and do likewise".
Public opinion in the United States seemed to be in favor
of the customs proposal. Washington was, however, somewhat
stirred over the fact that trade rights of other nations were in
volved in this pact. The project was so skillfully framed that
it might, according to the Times, evade both the peace treaties
and the most-favored-nation clause, on which most other preferen
tial treaties have been wrecked. The Washington government it-
self had a most-favored-nation treaty with Germany, still valid
for many years. But even if other nations objected to the Vien-
na Protocol, Stimson declared that he would suspend official
judgment until a careful study of the question had been made.
"It is a wise thing for them to do", said Senator Borah,
"Europe cannot recover until there is a great change in the soir
it of the Versailles treaty. I cannot see how anyone in Europe
can object to the agreement.
L. New York Times. March 25, 1951

The Vienna Protocol is a grave tactical blunder which threat-
ens to jeopardize the Disarmament Conference, declared the Brit-
ish Press."^ Englishmen looked upon the Protocol as a judicial
question. Its fulfillment depended on its compatibility with the
peace treaties. It would have been better if Germany and Austris
during the negotiations had consulted other interested powers a-
bout the legal side of the problem. Even the Socialist "Daily
Herald", previously a supporter of the Anschluss, having called
French fears fantastic now spoke about the serious error in pre-
senting the world a "fait accompli". The "Morning Post" stated
that this tactless act was not intended to further Pan-Europe
but Pan- Germany.
But they were not all antagonistic. The "Daily Express" ^
welcomed this Pact as the beginning of a European Union, even if
it were going to leave Britain isolated. This, it was explained,
would divide the world into three parts - the United States of
America, Europe and the British Commonwealth. Tariffs in Europe
would gradually be abolished and the reasons for frontiers would
disappear. "England should not lament because of the expansion
of a Free Trade Area, as long as the tariff s against the rest of
the world were not too high," declared the liberal "News Chron-
icle". This ou^ht to improve world trade and thus even be of
advantage to England. Through this agreement great progress had
been made in Briand's plan for an economic Pan-Europe.
1. Berliner Tageblatt. March 24, 1931.
2. Neue Freie Presse. March 25, 1951.
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The "Daily Mail" feared that Germany would destroy Englandb
trade relations with Austria by selling their cheap goods. The
preparations for the Protocol remarked the "London Times" were
economic but it was very possible that the Pact later would turn
out to have political significance - thus leading to another
diplomatic crisis.
Two financial papers, the "Financial News" and the "Financi Q.
Times" seemed to favor the agreement. The latter criticized
only the secret diplomacy between Vienna and Berlin. The "Pinan •
cial News" saw no danger in a Customs Union. "The real danger
lies in a disunited economic area and the tariff confusion in
the small nations." ^
All financial circles in England did not, however, approve
of the Vienna Protocol. The Federation of British Industries
protested on the grounds that it "might seriously injure the
industrial interests of Great Britain.""^ They hoped that"the
government would take measures to prevent the carrying out of
the union."
Argus in his study "The economic aspect of the Customs
Union" makes a detailed study in regard to its effect on Engli±L
trade. ^ England, according to hirr would lose the Austrian mar •
1. Berliner Tageblatt. March 25, 1951
2. Ibid. March 24, 1951
5. Ball, M.M., Post-V^ar German-Austrian Relations . 1936. P. 150.
4. Argus, "The Economic Aspect of the Austro-German Customs
Union. "1951. Pp. 49-50.

ket and suffer great losses in the German market, in consequence
of increased industrialization and greater German output.
Britain's export to the Balkans would deteriorate. She would all-
so suffer losses in Italy. Germany's competition with Great
Britain would be more successful when able to use her industries
to full capacity.
In taking into consideration the fact that German exports
in an increasing degree were becoming dependent on Western
European and overseas markets, it is evident she would probably
strive to keep up her friendly trade relations vi th the rest of
the world even if six and one-half million more people were add-
ed to her population. England should, on the other hand, welcom^
trade relations with an enlarged Germany. Britain still wanted
to eliminate tariffs and was not fundamentally opposed to the
agreement.
Reuter states that on March 26, 1951 Prance and England
agreed to let the question of a Customs Union go to the League.
Henderson believed that the main obstacle to the realization of
the Protocol was the danger of its leading Austria to violation
of her international obligations. The League machinery, he ad-
vised, was the best solution to this problem. Raris enthusiastic-
ally accepted Henderson's ideas.
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Ch. VIII. The Customs Union and the
League of Nations .
Chancellor Brtoing, answering Henderson's and Briand's pro-
posal to place the Vienna Protocol before the League, insisted
that the Customs Union did not violate the peace treaties.-^ In
his oDinion the agreement was made in the spirit of European
cooperation. It represented a plan to unify by regional under-
standings the various economic areas dissected from large pre-
war economic units. The independence of the oartners was not
affected. Therefore, Henderson's proposed inquiry into the le-
gal aspects of the Protocol was not justified, BrtTning did not,
however, oppose an examination of the question from a purely
judicial angle.
In England Brtining's answer was regarded as discourteous.
The Daily Herald said that Germany had "slapped the League in
the face."^ The conservative Morning Post decried the recent
German tendency to "mount her high horses". But the Times
stressed Brtfning's remark that Germany was not opposed to a
strictly judicial examination of the Protocol. Yet, Germany's
refusal to refer the political aspects to the League, did not
place Berlin in a very favorable position.
On March 51 Curtius spoke before the Reichsrat. The con-
ciliatory spirit of this declaration favorably impressed British
1. Dean, V.M., "European Efforts for Economic Collaboration",
For. Pol. Rep. Vol. VII. No. 12. Aug. 19, 1931.
2. Berliner Tageblatt. March 26, 1951.
3. New York Herald Tribune. April 5, 1931.
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opinion. Curtlus reassured the world that the union problem
was purely economic. Cornmercial difficulties had brought togeth
er the governments of Germany and Austria, Germany, he warned,
was threatened by a serious economic collapse. She had five
millions unemployed - willing to work. She was burdened by po-
litical obligations. Her agriculture languished. Capital had
about totally vanished. The only solution to this serious prob-
lem was international cooperation. Pan-Europe would develop
from regional agreements. Curtius told his listeners that Yugo-
slavia and Rumania were also planning a Customs Union, and gave
the example of the Customs Union between Esthonia and Lithuania,
functioning without friction for many years. The Aus tro-German
proposal was not, stated Curtlus, as exclusive as the plan pre-
sented by the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister - "a Customs
Union of the Little Entente, Including Austria, but expressly
excluding Germany." Explaining the relationship between Austria
and Germany, he continued, "if the Customs Union between Luxem-
burg and Belgium, which Implies an incomparably stronger affil-
iation of this small country, does not result in any impairment
of its sovereignty and independence, this cannot possibly happen
in the case of the Austro-German Customs Union, the inner struc-
ture of which guarantees in like manner the political, adminis-
trative and economic independence of both countries." He de-
nied vigorously that this proposal was a threat to peace or an
obstacle to the Disarmament Conference.
Germany consented to submit the question to the League of

Nations. Austria also gave her approval to this decision. Both
promised not to enforce the customs agreement until the League
had been consulted.
Meanwhile, in France, Briand had been defeated in the pres-
idential election by Paul Doumer (May 13. ) Premier Laval in-
duced him to remain in office as Foreign Minister and to complete!
his mission at Geneva. England feared, however, that Briand
might be of no further use in the European peace movement.
The Vienna Protocol was placed on the agenda of the May
Session of the League Council, On his own initiative, Curtius
submitted this complex problem to the European Committee at
Geneva. On May 15th the Commission of Enquiry for European
Union met at Geneva to discuss the Economic crisis and the Cus-
toms Union, To find a practical solution for this complicated
economic situation the statesmen needed mutual understanding and
cooperation. It was their opportunity to demonstrate that man
is a reasoning rather than a fighting creature.
The first meeting of the League Council was characterized
by bitter political controversies. Curtius discussed the diffi-
cult economic conditions in Europe and his favorite solution -
the Customs Unions."^ Briand, "the grand old man of the League"
seemed to have lost some of his former prestige, but protested
vigorously against the German method of solving the economic
2problem in Europe that, he stressed, France v/ould never accept.
1, League of Nations, Official Journal 1931. Pp . 1073-1074
.
2. Ibid. P. 1071.
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The French, condemning the Customs Union as a violation of
international obligations, presented a counter plan. In brief,
Prance opposed all preferential agreements, and advised the re-
tention or resumption of most-favored-nation treaties. Briand's
plan would expand the Customs Union into a Central European or
a Pan-European accord. Prance promised more financial help.
England was cool to this vague proposal.-^
Grandi, the Italian delegate, admitted that Customs Unions
are not a cure all, especially in a continent v\/ith such a multi-
tude of different and conflicting interests. A plan may afford
advantages to one group and disadvantages to another. Different
projects would benefit in different parts of the continent, in
keeping with particular conditions. In the case of Austria, he
continued, he was not convinced that the union would be advan-
tageous. ^
To add to the confusion, Geneva was full of rumors about a
commission to be sent to Vienna to investigate her impending
bankruptcy. Some statesmen doubted Austria's good faith. They
believed she was not striving hard enough to better her condi-
tions, and as proof pointed to extravangances in her budget.
The French "Instructive Memorandum" was presented to the
4Council on May 18th. It condemned the Protocol on several
1. Berliner Tageblatt, May 18, 1931
2. League of Nations Official Journal. 1951. P. 1072.
3. Berliner Tageblatt. May 16, 1931.
4. The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Documents of International Affairs. 1931. P. 6.
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counts, - first it objected to its secrecy; second, it compro-
mised Austria's independence and was thus incompatible with the
treaty obligations of the two countries, and finally it violated
the most-favored-nation clause. Admitting Austria's urgent need
the opponents of the measure feared the Protocol would disrupt
European peace and fail to restore prosperity.
The memorandum also pointed to the preferential agreements
provided for in Article 222 of the Treaty of Saint Germain,
Since this Article was never applied, Austria had failed to dem-
onstrate an honest desire to improve her status. Fundamentally,
Austria should not negotiate with any one country, but must im-
prove her relations with all the surrounding states. The French
solution then was really a resurrection of Curtius' "regional
agreements". Prance was certain that Austria's difficulties
were onlj temporary - requiring a period of economic adaptation
and proper exploitation of her own natural resources.
In a second speech, Grandi, with an eye on German expansior
in the Balkans, failed to see how the Customs Union could aid
Austria.
In answer to all these charges, Schober reasoned, "if,
however, by a far reaching interpretation the Geneva Protocol,
the anxiety for our independence were pushed so far that we lost
all freedom of rition in our relations with foreign countries,
then that attitude would indeed deprive us of our independence."^
In other vovds, the Geneva Protocol not only pledged Austria to
1. League of Nations Official Journal. 1951. P. 1069.

naintain her Independence, but also obliged the guarantor states
:o respect this independence.
"The essence of independence in international law," said
;)urtius, "is that every country must itself determine the extent
Df its corarni tments and independence."-'-
This general discussion took into consideration legal, his-
torical, political, and economic aspects of the Austro-G-erman
rotocol. Tension was eased and the debate demonstrated a new
Interest in the practical study of the general economic crisis.
Finally, insisting that the problem was a legal controversy
2
Henderson moved to refer the question to the World Court. When
the compatibility of the proposal with certain international ob-
ligations had been demonstrated, the Council would again recon-
sider the Protocol. England, he said, was prepared to discuss
the Customs Union after the Court had given its opinion. However
Briand warned that even if the Court found that the Protocol did
lot violate treaty obligations, France v;as still opposed to the
project.
Germany and Austria agreed to submit to the Court, the
[question of the legality, but not the economic or political as-
pects of the plan. They were sure that the Protocol could stand
a careful examination by the Court. A fact that may have strengfe|i
sned Germany's faith in the World Court was its recent advisory
opinion concerning access to German minority schools in Upper
L. League of Nations Official Journal. 1951. P. 1073.
2. Ibid. P. 1068.

Silesia, with a decision in favor of Germany,
Henderson's resolution to submit the question to the
World Court for an advisory opinion was accepted unanimously.
But even before the World Court began its study of the
controversy, an incident occurred that definitely prejudiced any
favorable conclusion to the Aus tro-German Customs Union. - Austr:i
disclosed her inability to continue payments on her debts. On
May 11th, 1931, the Credit Anstalt collapsed, an Anstalt dominat-
ing almost three-fourths of Austria's industrial undertakings."'"
The steady withdrawal of French credits, together with the deval-
uation of Austrian and foreign stocks had given this great bank-
ing institution its death blow, though its close connection with
the Boden Credit Anstalt and some mismanagement undoubtedly
played their part.
When the Vienna Protocol was signed, Austria declared she
was not aware of the conditions of the Credit Anstalt. The
Anstalt had extensive connections in almost every important for-
eign financial centre. Thus the consequences of this crash were
to be far-reaching.
Rumors reached Berlin that a loan from Paris might take the
2place of Customs Union. Some banking organization under the
French branch of the House of Rothschild was said to have made ar
offer to invest 150,000,000 shillings if Austria promised to
abandon the Vienna Protocol. Austria is said to have rejected
1. Berliner Tageblatt. May 13, 1931.
2. Ibid. May 13, 1931.
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this political-financial presai re and appealed to Britain for
assistance. The Bank of Enp;land, fearing further delay, advancec
the sum in form of short term loans. France, greatly annoyed
by this move, considered it a diplomatic defeat.
The most serious result of Austrian bankruptcy was its
effect on the uncertain financial situation in Germany, already
approaching ruin. In spite of the fact that the Credit Anstalt
had. been rescued, the exposure of the unsound condition of Cen-
tral Europe could not be prevented. The political strain be-
tween Berlin and Paris and the lack of confidence in German eco-
nomic conditions caused her creditors to. withdraw their funds.
The situation became desperate and seriously threatened to devel-
op into a European debacle. To prevent a complete breakdown the
Hoover moratorium v;as announced on June 22, 1931.
Germany had demonstrated herself too v/eak to help Austria
financially. Accordingly, Austria looked elsev/here for support.
She had discovered that French positive assistance was more help-
ful than German promises. Naturally then, conceptions of econom-
ic union were gradually abandoned even before securing the ad-
visory opinion from the World Court.
1. League of Nations official Journal. 1931. P. 2410.
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Ch. IX, Advisory Opinion of the «jorld Court on the
Gust orris Jnion betv/een ^>.ustrla and G-erriany .
On May 19th, 1931, the Permanent Coiirt of International
Justice, better known in the United States as the World Court,
was requested to give an advisory opinion on the following
question:
"Would a regime established between Germany and Austria or|
the basis and v/ithin the limits of the principles laid down by
the Protocol of March 19th, 1951—be compatible with Article 88
of the Treaty of Saint Germain and v/ith the Protocol ho, 1 at
Geneva on October 4th, 1922?"
As previously promised, the request v/as merely concerned
v\fith the strictly legal aspects of the Vienna Protocol. The
Court was to decide if Austria had violated certain assumed inter-
national obligations. The Court was not asked to give an opinicfn
on the desirability of the Customs Union. Neither the policies
Involved nor the question of the leg-.-lity of Germany's action
were included.
In March, when the Protocol was announced, British jurietii
ffialntained in advance of the Court's opinion, that the pact was
2
compatible with the treaties. The German professor, Kelsen,
also voicing his views before the Court released its verdict,
announced that "the assimilation of customs lav/s and the remov-
al of customs frontiers" would not in any v/ay reduce the Inde-
3 Saint
_pendenc£ of Austria. Referring to Article 88 of the Treaty of_^"
""l. hudson, M.G., world Court Reports . Vol. 11. 1927-1932. P. 713
2. Neue Freie Presse. I.iarch 24, 1931.
3. Ball, lA.lvl., Post-War German- Austrian Relations , 1936, Pp.lo9|
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jermain, he demonstrated thst Austria's independence was secure,
and that she was allowed freedom of action in concluding tariffs,
trade and financial agreements. Since the Protocol provided for
inclusion of other nations, Germany had not been granted exclu-
sive advantages.
These final expressicns of opinion, before the Court con-
bened, were like the parting and final shots delivered for a lost
sause
.
First, from July 20 to August 5, public debates and hear-
Ln^^.s v/ere held before the Co'jrt. Then arose the question of al-
.
owing Austria and Czechoslovakia to appoint national judges ad
loc to sit in this case. Gonsiderin.'i'; the fact that the German
judge represented the Austrian opinion and that Prance snd Italy
represented Czechoslovakia, the Court decided that there was no
:ieec for the apnointment cf judges ad hoc,"^
After weeks of deliberation and study, on September 5th,
:|.931, the Court announced its "advisory opinion". By a vote 8
o 7 it v/as decided that the "Customs Regime" established by
Jermany and Austria in accordance with the Vienna Protocol of
farch 19, 1951, would not be compatible with the provisions of
he Geneva Protocol of October 4, 1922V ^
The majority opinion remarked that Austria was a "sensitive
oint" in the post-war European system. The maintenance of
1. League of Nations. Monthly Summary. Vol. XI. 1951. P. 190.
2. Hudson, M. G., The V^"orld Court 1922-1958. P. 210.
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Austria's Independence was essential for the "present political
settlement"."^ Examining the treaties involved and especially
the meaning of the word independence, the majority opinion con-
tinued, that the Austrian consent to "abstain from any act which
might compromise her independence" as stated in the last sen-
tence of Article 88 refers to the first sentence involving the
alienation of her independence, but is ^-ot necessarily an act
directl;y causing the loss of her independence. It rather ought
to be interpreted as an act "calculated to endanger" this inde-
pendence so far as can be conslGtently foreseen.
In the Geneva Protocol, Austria assumed certain obligations
in the economic sphere - not to"violate the economic independence
by granting to any state a special regime or exclusive advantage 5
calculated to threaten this independence." No other country
bound by a Customs Union has ever accepted obligations to ab-
stain from any act "calculated to compromise its economic inde-
pendence" But thr'ough the General Protocol Austria was made an
exception to this rule.
The opinion continued with an examination of the Vienna
2Protocol of 1931. The provisions of this project did rot by
themselves "constitute an act alienating Austria's independence",
because Austria would, in spite of the Protocol, still continue
to exist as a separate state within her own frontiers and with
1. Hudson, M. G., World Court Reports . Vol. II. ir27-1932. P. 719.
2. Ibid. Pap-e 723.
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her own government and administration.
But the Customs Union contributed certain exclusive advan-
tages to Germany and this regime was, considered as a whole,
threatening the economic independence of Austria. Therefore,
the eight majority votes declared that the customs regime was in-
compatible vvith the obligations assumed in the before mentioned
Geneva Protocol."''
On bhe affirmative side, Judge Anzilotti, in his individual
opinion made it clear that a state remains independent in spite
of extensive and burdensome obligations as long as its legal au-
thority is not restricted, "According to ordinary international
law, every country is free to renounce its independence and even
its existence," Anzilotti remarked, but "this rule does not appl/
to Austria who, under Article 88, cannot voluntsrily lose her in-
dependence" - except with the consent of the League. Pointing
out that Article 88 was adopted not to favor Austria, but to im-
pose on her obligations favorable to Europe as a whole, Anzilott:
maintained, that he was more concerned with questions of fact
thsn over legal consequences. The restrictions in Article 88
were imposed to check the Anschluss movement between Germany and
Austria. In the li i:ht of the facts known about this movement,
"based upon community of race, language, culture and upon a very
strong sentiment of common nationality", strengthened by the dif-
ficult post-war situation in Austria, Anzilotti looks into the
1. Hudson, K.G., V«orld Court Reports. Vol. II. 1927-32, P. 724
2. Ibid. P. 727.
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effect of this movement upon Austrian independence. Oermany and
Austria, he continues, di spropor tioned in economic strength, woul|[i
with their economic life combined through the Customs Union,
probably continue on the same path until political union was
achieved. As a similar historic precedent the Fallvercin Is
mentioned, as playing "a by no mesjis unimportant part in paving
the way for German unity".
After this aopreciative consideration of the political and
economic facts involved, Anzilotti reaches the conclusion that
the Customs Regime is incompatible both vrL th the Vienna Protocol
and with Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain. "Austris is
therefore obliged to abstain from it or to ask the consent of
the Council of the League of Nations."'"
The dissenting minority maintained that "a State would
not be indeoendent in the legal sense if it was placed in a con-
dition of dependence on another povi^er - if it lost the right to
exercise its own judgment in coming to the decisions which the
government of its territory entails." However, if a state agree
to restrict ir.s liberty of action, without depriving Itself of
its "organic powers" the independence of the state is not af-
fected. A clear distinction ought to be made between the alien-
ation of Independence and restrictions under law, accepted by a
state without affecting its independence. For instance, member-
ship in the League of Nations does not limit the independence of
1. Hudson, M.G., World Court Reports . Vol. II. 1927-32. P. 735
2. Ibid. P. 737
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the adhering states.
The minority opinion also held that before the customs
regime could be condemned it m.ust be proved that it imperiled
"the continued existence of Austria as a state caoable of exerci i-
ing within its territory all the powers of an Independent state. '
The Court was not concerned with political considerations. A
legal decision should not be influenced by political consequence;
and fu.ture developments. If the regime was "celculated to
threaten" the independence of Austria it is not the establish-
ment of the regime, but possible consequences resulting from sue! i
an establishment, that are incompatible with Austria's treaty
obligations. The Court found no evidence showing that a Customs
Union concluded on the basis of complete equality would endanger
the independence of the participating states. Furthermore,
Article IX of the Vienna Protocol was included chiefly to guar-
antee the Independence of Austria, providing that commercial
treaties with third powers can b e negotiated separately, but if
possible jointly. The latter part of this stipulation did, how-
ever, oblige the states to "see that the interests of the other
party are not violated." This would not, however, threaten
Austria's independence, because If endangered, Austria could de-
nounce the proposed treaty (Article XII.)
The minority opinion thus concluded that the customs regime
was compatible both with the Geneva Protocol and Article 88 of
t^e Treaty of Saint Germain.-'-
1. Hudson, M.G., Vv'orld Court Reports. Vol. II. 1927-32.
pprT4r^i^
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On September 3, 1931, two days before the Court decision
was announced, Schober and Curtius expressed their intention not
1
to proceed with the intended negotiations. They told the Com-
mission of Enquiry for European Union at a meeting in Geneva,
that they no lonp:er wanted to "challenge the hostile opinion
which the publication of the Protocol had invoked." This declar
ation, they hODed, would encourage foreign governments to coop-
erate Tnore constructively. Both Austria and Germany would, ac-
cording to their representatives, be willing to participate in
this European collaboration.
The ruling of the World Court aroused a whirlwind of con-
troversy.
As the supporter of a conception of a United States of
Europe, France occupied a peculiar position. Public opinion was
necessarily divided. Some could not honestly object to such a
concrete proposal for economic recovery. At the same time a
general satisfaction was evident over the Austro-German decision
to discontinue negotiations. It was felt that the tense atmos-
phere in the European Committee would imnrove. Among other
reasons, France had opposed the Anschluss immediately after the
war on the grounds that Germany should not be compensated for
her territorial losses. Popular opinion, except for extremists
on either side, interpreted the decision as a reflection of the
spirit of Versailles and a vindication of the French policy re-
straining grov/ing German influence.
1. League of Nations Official Journal. 1931. P. 2186.

93.
As for the Court's opinion, Itself, It is interesting to
note that the judges who v;rote the opinion against the Union
were almost all representatives of countries allied directly or
indirectly with Prance. The votes cast by Cuba and Salvador,
cancelled the weight of United States and Britain. The majority
opinion was held by judges from Prance, Italy, Poland, Spain,
Rumania, Salvador, Cuba and Columbia.
Defending the advisory opinion as not being a political one
Davis asks, "How did France lose the vote of Belgium?" - How wa \
she able to dominate the votes of Spain and Italy, not at this
time very friendly? And, furthermore, what interest would
Columbia, Salvador and Cuba have in keeping Germany and Austria
ap ar t ?
If the judges had voted like ordinary politicians, taking
national prejudices into consideration, the uproar of protest
might be justified. But which opinion was guided by politics,
which opinion by law - is a difficult question to answer.
The fact that so m.any judges dissented from the majority
opinion deprived the judgment of much of its impressiveness. In
answer, Davis maintains that unanimity is not a test of sound-
ness. The ijudges split upon "questions clearly susceptible of
different conclusions." He admits the existence of political
considerations in the Court, when he states that, "judges are
not archangels", - if we should do away with the Court "because
it had been accused of responding to sectional or political in-
1. Davis, J.W.,"The World Court Settles the Question".
Atlantic Monthly. Jan. 1932.

fluences we should have abolished our ov^ti Supreme Court years
ago."
The average American, favorable to the union, could not see
why two states should not be allowed to absorb one another's
goods in accordance v/ith a mutual a';^reement. They believed the
two countries should be praised for initiating a movement to
abolish the tariff barriers retarding the recovery of Europe and
the world. Popular indignation even condemned this narrow le-
galistic attitude, and some went so far as to sug-xest, that if
the judges had not been influenced by politics, the Court could
in order to achieve a great right - have ventured to do a little
juridical wrong."
On the other hand, Davis insisted that the Court considered
the Customs Union "from a practical standpoint, weigjiing those
consequences which might be foreseen."
This wide divergence of opinion was not limited to the av-
erage citizen. An enquiry addressed to a group of judges,
professors, lawyers and deans of sd'iools of law revealed the
sam.e differences of opinion, almost in the same proportion as
the World Court judges. Of the 63 who answered, 29 sided with
the minority opinion, while 34 favored the majority. To add to
the confusion, a number of those in sympathy with the majority
decision, as the more reasonable, declared they were not opposed
to Anschluss.
The Court confused judicial rights and obligations with
political probabilities according to Margaret Ball, but the dis-

senting opinion seemed to be the"most logical". The opinion
of Davis is th&t the majority arrived at a "sounder result".
The press of Austria and Germany was disgusted with the way
matters had been settled.- It contended that the Customs Uni6n
between Rumania and Jugoslavia was not opoosed. Besides, accord
ing to Anzilotti, a Danubian Federation would not have been for-
bidden. It was the special relationship between Austria and
Germany that made the union dangerous for Austrian Independence.
2
Aroused over the Court decision Leibrock warned, that
"from the German viewpoint, there is, in spite of the Hague
decision over the Customs Protocol, no other solution for the
Austrian problem than union with Germany. The common national-
ity and culture of these two countries already urges the people
towards this union. If they both want to unite, no power in the
world can in the long run prevent them from doing it."
1. Ball. M. M., Post-War German-Austrian Relations. 1936. P. 177
2. Leibrock, 0., Deutschland Im welt oolltlschen Geschehen.T^,—FT*!^ '

Conclusion
Though the World Court had forbidden the Austro-German ec-
onomic union, the problem still remained and demanded immediate
solution. Following an appeal from Austria, the League of Na-
tions sent a Commission of experts to Vienna. This act v/as bit-
terly denounced as a further burden on the Austrian taxpayer,
for the free entertainment, lodgings and free railroad travel of
the investigating committee.-^
On July 15, 1932, Austria signed a new Geneva Protocol in
which Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands
promised financial assistance. The usual remedies of concen-
trating on natural resources, reciprocity treaties with Danubian
States and new Federations were revived and solemnly reincorpor-
ated in the Commission's records. They did not forget to men-
tion her v/ater power, agriculture, and health resorts. Even the
luring of vacationers from the Swiss to the Tirolese Alps was
advised. It was like pouring water in a sieve. Never was a
country blessed vi/ith more numerous, varied and expert plans to
recover from economic prostration. Never was the response more
di smal
.
While proposals and counter proposals were hurled at Austri^.,
in Germany, a National Socialist movement began to make itself
felt and heard- its leader one Adolf Hitler.
In one of its reports on the ovement, the "Berliner
Tageblatt" remarked that the "student groups, inflamed with
1. Germains, V.W., Austria of To-Day. 1952. P. 242.
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nationalist socialist ideas, at many occasions have shown that
they are not filled with a healthy spirit of youth, but with a
brutality that has nothing to do with Germany's cultural herit-
age .
Von Papen may have had a prophetic insight when he pro-
clalm,ed that "not only the existence of the German nation, but
also the future of Europe depends on this Customs Union." ^ But
Von Papen apparently laid too much emphasis upon this agreement.
Germany, after years of dissatisfaction was ripe for the coup d'
etat of the National Socialists. The failure to achieve union
with Austria had but a minor effect on Germany's subsequent
hi story.
Hitler was now in power. Five years later in March of 1938^
his gigantic war machine rolled into Austria. Anschluss was ac-
complished by a simple order from der Puhrer, nov/ against Austria*
a' s consent
.
This study of the Austro-German Customs Union demonstrates
a fundamental truth that must be taken into consideration in any
attempt to solve human problems. That is - no one effort, no
s^'n.^le branch of man's labor or undertaking, stands out by itself.
All his actions and accomplishments are so intimately related
that the endeavor to remove or change one immediately effects th<
!
others.
1. Berliner Tageblatt. March 6, 1931.
2. Ball, M. M., Post-War German-Austrian Relations. P. 135

The world In general and the appointed judges in particular
were unable to consider the Customs Union by itself - the purely-
legal aspects of the question was submerged by economic, polit-
ical and social considerations and smothered by prejudice.

Comprehensive Abstract .
The history of the Austro-German Customs Union represents
a fascinating and eventful epoch In modern European annals. A
review of this subject is particularly interesting in that it
reveals that Austria's desperate and uncertain plight was a mag-
nified echo of the entire European situation. Austria suffered
in a more violent manner, the same privations and economic dis-
asters experienced by the rest of the continent.
To remedy this a. tuation economic union had been suggested
at various times and occasions. A political union was out of
the question for it had been expressly forbidden by the Peace
Treaties of 1919 and by the Geneva Protocol. The latter assured
Austria financial assistance if her economic and political inde
pendence were not impaired.
The Protocol was created to bolster Austria during the post
war chaos when the clamor for union was particularly insistent.
At that time when the commercial crisis was at its height, the
Austrian provinces threatened to take m.atters in their own hands
if Vienna was unable to solve the problem.
For several years following this acute outburst, the Aus-
trian Republic, under League supervision, made slow but steady
gains in the economic field. In 1926 when Austria appeared to
have achieved economic stability. League control ceased. But
when the entire world slumped into an economic depression, Aus-
tria's condition became correspondingly v^orse. Thus union v;ith
Germany was again proposed as the solution for Austria's econom-
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ic problems.
There v/ere two methods available to accomplish this union.
One was Drovided for in the Treaty of Saint Germain. This re-
quired, however, the unanimous consent of the League of Nations.
As long as France feared a greater Germany, this consent woulu
never be given. The alternative was openly to defy the treaty
and proclaim the union.
To solve Austria's rapidly deteriorating position, the
Gordian knot was cut with the announcement of the Vienna Pro toco
The authors of this pact, after a careful study of stipulations
of the peace treaties and the Geneva Protocol were certain that
a Customs Union, in which the partners were treated as equals
without compromising their independence, could not be denounced
as a violation of any ether treaty obligations.
The sunporters of this union declared that its origin was
purely economic, therefore, it f^hould not be judged from a po-
litical point of view.
But taking into consideration the Austro-German background,
it was impossible to limit the discussion to a purely economic
sphere. Economic interests were not the only factors involved.
Historical, cultural, racial and legal questions were intimate-
ly mingled. They had all played their part in the efforts to
establish the Customs Union.
The advocates of the union insisted that Austria could not
exist as an independent economic unit because of the territorial
losses suffered after World War I.
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The opponents of this plan were equally insistent that
Austria could manage alone - though she might not be able to
preserve her high standards of living. Austria, they advised,
should modernize her industrial equipment and more fully util-
ize her nattiral resources, for the beneficial results of the
Customs Union would be overbalanced by the ill effects.
Meanwhile, fuel was added to the fire by the failure of
the Credit Anstalt. This collapse had extensive repercussions,
that revealed the economic interdependence of today's nations,.
The failure of the Credit Anstalt also demonstrated that
Austria required French credit, assistance and confidence.
Supporting France in her opposition to this union, the
Slav States feared that a greater Germany would attract the
German minority groups incorporated within their own boundaries
Prance, on the other hand, feared that an expanding Germany
would threaten the whole continent.
Italy, unv/illing to have Germany spread to her own fron-
tiers, warned th&t the union v;ould lead to war. Thus France,
Italy and the Little Entente, fearful for their national secur-
ity, successfully vetoed the Customs Union.
However, the controversy proved beneficial in one respect.
It presented to the world Austria's really critical situation.
Many influential persons were won to the idea of treaty revis-
ion to better her conditions. They pointed to the League of
Nations as having the machinery to do so, in Article XIX of the
Covenant, which authorized the signatures to alter the status
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quo
.
The League could have sanctioned an open union between
Germany and Austria and g:uaranteed its enforcement under League
control. This would have safeguarded national security and at
the same time prevented the possible danger of a secret political,
and military alliance.
But the Leagiae failed to take this action, and the question
was referred to the Viorld Court.
The Court's adverse opinion aroused a storm of violent dis-
cussions. Some even went so far as to accuse the Court of being
dominated by political intrigues. Both the League and the Court
lost prestige as a result of this affair.
After the decision, Austria was again given financial help
-
but without permanent results. Then the situation became furthe:*
complicated by the rise of the National Socialists in Germany.
The actions of this movement alienated most Austrians from
the idea of Anschluss. But by this time liberty of action was
no lonp:er their' s. Hitler's order established complete union.
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